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evaluate how many and what types of workers would be most affected by a hypothetical coordination of 
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of 60% of the median national wages and drawing from the two most recent EU-wide data sources on 
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Introduction 
Minimum wages exist in all EU member states, even if, as we shall see in this report, they are set 
up and established in very different ways. Minimum wages, in fact, can be considered as a 
cornerstone of the “European Social Model”. Yet, the on-going process of European integration 
has so far had very little to do with them. Wages are explicitly excluded from the competences of 
European institutions in the existing treaties, contrary to other areas of work and employment 
such as working time or health and safety. 
But in the context of increasing European integration, it seems at least plausible that sooner or 
later there would be some attempt of coordinating this important aspect of social policy across 
countries. As we will see in this report, the idea has been discussed at the European level several 
times since the EU was born, and it seems to be gaining momentum the context of the current 
economic crisis. Of course, the discussion is by no means settled, as many important European 
and national actors consider that this area should remain within the remit of national governments 
and according to national traditions and practices. It is certainly possible that wages, and 
minimum wages, would remain squarely at the level of national competence in the foreseeable 
future. 
Still, it seems like a worthwhile exercise (useful to the debate) to explore what kind of 
implications would be associated with such a coordination of European minimum wage policy. 
This is what we will try to do in this report. Without taking ourselves a position, we will try to 
provide arguments and facts that we hope can be useful in this debate. The report is organized in 
two big sections. In the first one, we will discuss the theoretical and policy considerations around 
a coordinated EU minimum wage policy. We will review the social sciences literature on the 
effects of minimum wages, present a broad picture of the current debates around the coordination 
of EU minimum wage policy and discuss the institutional difficulties that such a coordination 
would in our view have to face. In other words, that section will try to provide a balanced 
summary of the theoretical and policy arguments around this debate. The second big section will 
try to complement the arguments with some facts, by carrying out a “simple accounting exercise” 
to evaluate how many and what types of workers would be most affected by a hypothetical 
coordination of minimum wage policy in the different countries, using a baseline scenario of a 
single national wage floor of 60% of the median national wages and drawing from the two most 
recent EU-wide data sources on wages and income. 
Eurofound was established in 1975 with the mandate of contributing with knowledge to the 
planning and design of better living and working conditions in Europe. We hope that this report 
can at least contribute to the debate.
1
 
Part 1: Theoretical and policy considerations around a 
coordinated EU minimum wage policy 
 
Broadly speaking, a minimum wage is a level of pay under which no employment relation is 
permitted. The existence of a minimum wage is primarily justified on moral grounds: although in 
a market economy the determination of wages is in principle the result of the (individual or 
collective) negotiation between employers and workers, the society might consider that there is a 
                                                     
1
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Grimshaw, Stephen Kampelmann, Rafael Muñoz de Bustillo Llorente, Mark Smith, Donald Storrie, 
Christian Welz and the members of the advisory committee on Industrial Relations and Working 
Conditions of Eurofound for very useful input to earlier versions of this report. We would also like to thank 
the Eurostat team dealing with the European Structure of Earnings Survey for their support. 
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threshold of pay below which employment is not acceptable, even if there would be employers 
and workers willing to trespass it. The operationalization of such threshold may take different 
forms, as we shall see: most importantly, it may be set by the government through regulation, or 
by social partners through collective bargaining. Although there may be other justifications for 
the existence of minimum wages (for instance, the stimulation of aggregate demand within a 
Keynesian policy framework), the ultimate rationale behind the existence of minimum wages is 
normative. 
 
Since the 19th Century, trade unions have tried to introduce (and raise) wage floors for their 
constituencies, but wide-coverage minimum wages only became established in the second half of 
the 20th Century. Where unions were strong, minimum wages were often established through 
collective bargaining, usually sector-specific and sometimes non-binding (ie, only affecting union 
members, which were nevertheless the vast majority of employees). Where unions were less 
strong, governments established statutory minimum wages or extended by law collectively agreed 
wage floors, in most cases with a single national threshold and no exclusions. Those different 
origins are behind the different existing systems of minimum wage setting in Europe
2
, shown in 
table 1. 
 
 Statutory regulation Collective agreements 
Single national 
minimum wage 
Western countries: France, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Ireland, UK 
Southern countries: Malta, Spain, Portugal 
Eastern countries: Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia 
Bipartite agreements: Belgium, Estonia, 
Greece 
Tripartite agreements: Bulgaria, Poland, 
Slovakia 
Sectoral and/or 
occupational minimum 
wages 
Cyprus Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden 
Continental countries: Austria, 
Germany, Italy 
Table 1: Different systems of minimum wage settings in Europe (source: Schulten 2012) 
 
Today, the majority of EU member states have national statutory minimum wages, as can be seen 
in table 1. The predominance of this system was reinforced by the EU enlargement to the East, 
because most of the acceding countries adopted it in the 1990s. But even in the old member 
states, recent developments have reinforced the predominance of the statutory model: most 
importantly, the adoption of national statutory minimum wages in the UK and Ireland at the turn 
of the century, and the possible introduction of a national statutory minimum wage in Germany in 
the near future.
3
 
 
So although the diversity in the mechanisms and structure of minimum wages across Europe is 
still important, such diversity has been considerably reduced in recent years, and it is likely to be 
even further reduced in the future. Such convergence can facilitate considerably the design and 
implementation of a hypothetical common minimum wage policy across the EU. 
 
                                                     
2
 For obvious reasons, the historical origins of the minimum wage systems in Eastern European countries 
do not fit entirely this narrative. But although they were established much later and in very different 
circumstances, the fact that they all opted for the statutory system is surely related to the weakness of their 
industrial relations systems. 
3
 See http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2013/03/articles/de1303019i.htm.  
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In this section, we will discuss from a theoretical and policy perspective some of the potential 
implications of such a policy. First, we will briefly summarize the economic and social sciences 
literature on the impact of minimum wages on employment, competitiveness and social 
inequalities. Then, we will present a broad picture of the current debates on the possibility of 
establishing a common EU minimum wage policy. Finally, we will discuss the institutional 
difficulties for establishing such a policy across different member states. 
 
 
1. Review of the literature on the effect of minimum wages 
 
Minimum wage policy is a highly controversial subject in the specialized literature, in which we 
often find surprisingly contradictory theoretical and empirical arguments. The present section will 
try to make a brief overview of the main arguments about the potential effects of minimum wages 
on employment, poverty and inequality, competitiveness and other social and economic issues. 
 
Employment effects 
 
In the standard neoclassic model which is taught in most introductory economics textbooks, the 
minimum wage is either irrelevant or produces unemployment. In the context of a competitive 
labour market, a minimum wage set below the equilibrium level (the one that results from the free 
interaction of suppliers and buyers of labour) would simply be irrelevant. But a minimum wage 
set above the equilibrium level would necessarily lead to unemployment, since it would make 
some low-paid (normally low-skilled and/or young) workers too costly for employers to hire with 
profit, while simultaneously increasing the number of people willing to work because of the 
attractiveness of higher salaries. Therefore, from this perspective the minimum wage policy tends 
to actually damage those that it intends to help. 
 
According to the Keynesian approach, on the other hand, higher minimum wages do not 
necessarily increase unemployment at the macroeconomic level: they will affect relative prices of 
the affected industries, altering the structure of demand and supply with unpredictable effects on 
overall employment. But since workers receiving minimum wages have a higher propensity to 
consume, it is often argued from this perspective that minimum wage hikes may actually lift 
aggregate demand, output and employment (Herr and Kazandziska 2011). 
 
Economic theory predicts that a minimum wage may as well increase employment under certain 
scenarios. For instance, in the case of a monopsony, where a single buyer of labour exists, a 
binding minimum wage (that is, one which is set above the monopsonic equilibrium level) can 
increase the number of people employed by the firm.
4
 Moreover, even if we assume a potentially 
negative impact of minimum wages for the employment of the least productive workers, a 
binding minimum wage could work as an incentive for such workers to increase their education 
and training in order to raise their productivity levels and remain employed (Cahuc and Michel 
1996). Under efficiency wage models, the productivity of labour depends on the wage paid, so 
                                                     
4
 In monopsony, the firm is not a price-taker: it can reduce the wage by employing fewer workers. This 
means that both employment and wages will be lower than in the conditions of a competitive market. In 
this context, a skillfully set minimum wage can increase employment (and efficiency), by imposing a 
(higher) wage level closer to the one that would obtain in competitive conditions. For a discussion, see 
Manning 1995. 
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that employees will be more productive when earning higher wages due to higher commitment, 
which may encourage employers to maintain or expand their labour force (Georgiadis 2012). 
 
So overall, the impact of minimum wages on employment is indeterminate according to economic 
theory: although the simple neoclassic model would assume a negative impact, such effect only 
holds in a purely competitive model which is hardly ever found in reality. In non-competitive 
labour markets, such effect is unclear even from a neoclassic perspective; and in Keynesian 
approaches, the impact of minimum wages on employment depends on their impact on demand 
and price structures, being again highly uncertain. In other words, theory alone cannot solve this 
issue, which makes it necessary to turn to empirical analysis. 
 
At an empirical level, the employment effect of minimum wages is one of the most researched 
topics in labour economics, but again the results are inconclusive. The consensus view among 
mainstream economists until the early 1980's was that minimum wages had a negative impact on 
employment, especially for low-skilled and younger workers, as summarized by the statement of 
Brown (1982) that “a 10% increase in the minimum wage reduces teenage employment by 1 to 
3%”.5 But these results were challenged in the early 1990s by a new wave of studies on minimum 
wages. 
 
By using both natural experiments (Card and Krueger 1994, 2000) and other robust empirical 
approaches (Allegretto at al. 2011), these more recent studies found much smaller negative 
employment effects of minimum wages even for teens, often not statistically significant. Despite 
the higher levels of minimum wages existing in Europe, different empirical studies (Dolado et al. 
1996; Vaughan-Whitehead 2010) also failed to identify significant disemployment effects of 
minimum wages. As summarized by Martin and Immervoll (2007), "the evidence shows that an 
appropriately set minimum wage need not have large negative effects on job prospects, especially 
if wage floors are properly differentiated (e.g. lower rates for young workers) and non-wage 
labour costs are kept in check.” 
 
Some researchers have pointed out that this apparent contradiction between the standard 
economic theory and empirical results can be explained by the existence of adjustment channels 
to maintain profitability when minimum wages are established or increased without necessarily 
having to lay off workers. Such adjustment channels would include: cost reductions resulting 
from a lower labour turnover; efficiency improvements by the organization or by more motivated 
staff; reductions in wages of higher earners (“wage compression”); small price increases; a 
reduction in working hours and cuts in training or other fringe benefits, etc. (Schmitt 2013). 
 
Inequality and poverty 
 
In general, minimum wages are not explicitly aimed at reducing wage inequality and poverty, but 
at establishing a minimum rate under which any employment relation is considered to be 
                                                     
5
 The US Minimum Wage Study Commission published in 1981 a long review of the main theoretical 
arguments and empirical research on the topic, concluding that negative employment effects existed for 
teenagers and possibly other younger workers. Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982) summarized it and 
distinguished employment effects between different groups: for teenagers (16-19 years old), a 10% increase 
in the minimum wage reduced employment by 1-3%; for young adults (20-24) the impact is negative but 
smaller than for teenagers; for adults, the impact is uncertain both according to theory and empirical 
research. 
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unacceptable (ie, the establishment of morally-based labour standards). But minimum wages are 
obviously related to both wage inequality and poverty. Indeed, minimum wages compress the 
wage distribution by raising the lowest wages and therefore reduce inequality, provided the 
increase in the minimum wage is not compensated by a similar increase in other wages. To the 
extent that such an increase would affect some workers under the poverty line, it would also 
reduce poverty. But as was the case for employment, the scale and importance of such effects are 
largely an empirical issue, which depend on the number of workers affected by the increase and 
the household distribution of income. 
 
It is a very well-established fact that wage inequality has increased considerably over the last few 
decades across most advanced market economies, but most of that increase has taken place at the 
upper tail of the distribution
6
 (Atkinson at al, 2011; see also Gordon and Dew-Becker 2008). The 
earnings of the highest paid (the upper 10%, 1% or even 0.1%) have increased much faster than 
the those of everyone else, and this on its own explains most of the increase in inequality. Since 
minimum wages have only an effect on the lower tail of the distribution of wages (they obviously 
have no impact on very high wage levels), this suggests that they can have only a relatively low 
impact on overall inequality. 
 
That said, most existing research on this issue does show that minimum wages (and their 
evolution) play an important role in explaining the patterns of wage inequality in the lower tail of 
the distribution, not only directly by raising the lowest wages, but also indirectly through 
spillover effects (Teulings 2003; Autor, Manning and Smith 2010). Of course, the impact of a 
minimum hike on the wage distribution will be larger in those cases where there are many 
workers currently paid at minimum wages levels.
7
 
 
On the other hand, some argue that the effect of minimum wages on poverty reduction is not so 
clear-cut, because most minimum wage earners are not found in poor households
8
 (and therefore, 
minimum wage hikes would have a limited impact on poverty at a household level; Brown 1999). 
To the extent that one of the main causes of poverty in Europe is being out of employment (one 
would not expect minimum wages to raise the living standards of households in which nobody 
works), the welfare systems would be better tools than minimum wages to fight poverty. For 
instance, according to Maitre et al. (2012), most European low-paid employees live in households 
with more than one wage earner and are not affected by relative household poverty. The literature 
indicates that rather than the level of minimum wages, the household composition and the number 
of wage earners are the key factors behind household poverty levels (Marx et al. 2012). 
 
                                                     
6
 This increase in wage inequality is the main driver behind a more general increase in income inequality. 
“This rise of top income shares is due not to the revival of top capital incomes, but rather to the very large 
increases in top wages (especially top executive compensation). As a consequence, top executives (the 
“working rich”) replaced top capital owners (the “rentiers”) at the top of the income hierarchy during the 
twentieth century” (Piketty and Saez 2006) 
7
 If minimum wages are set at a relatively high level and there are no spillover effects, there can be some 
unintended social consequences. A large spike in the bottom of the wage distribution can create excessively 
compressed wage structures for some low-paid jobs, practically eliminating wage increases over the career 
of the worker, for instance (Gautié 2010). Such an effect largely depends on the strength of collective 
bargaining in each country and even sector (Grimshaw, Bosch and Rubery 2013). 
8
 The usual example would be teenagers in middle-class households. 
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Competitiveness and other economic effects 
 
In the current economic situation, European policy places a strong focus on the relationship 
between national wage developments and international competitiveness, as underpinned in the 
recent Euro Plus Pact.
9
 Within one of the four objectives of the initiative, that of fostering 
competitiveness, a strong emphasis is placed on the idea that wages should evolve in line with 
productivity to keep unit labour costs stable. If unit labour costs, equivalent to the ratio between 
labour costs per hour and labour productivity (output per hour), undergo large increases, 
competitiveness may be damaged.
10
 It could be argued that if a country decides to increase its 
minimum wage, without any corresponding increase in productivity, the costs faced by national 
companies will increase and they will become less competitive vis-à-vis competitors from other 
countries. This effect will be larger in labour intensive industries, where labour costs represent a 
higher share of the total costs faced by firms.   
 
There are a number of potential objections to the previous argument. First, increases in minimum 
wages tend to foster increases in productivity (Rizov and Croucher 2011; McLoughlin 2007), so 
that the final result in terms of unit labour costs and therefore competitiveness may even be 
positive. After all, it is empirically the case that the most competitive European economies tend to 
have higher, rather than lower minimum wage levels (ie, Nordic countries). Second, low-paid 
employees are not typically concentrated in trade-intensive industries such as manufacturing, but 
in non-traded sectors such as services, especially personal services (Dolado et al. 1996). This 
means that an increase in minimum wages will have a limited impact on internationally 
competitive industries, since moderate wages are rarely the key factor behind international 
competitiveness, at least in Europe.
11
 Furthermore, competitiveness is influenced both by price 
factors (wages and productivity, which together explain unit labour costs, but as well exchange 
rates and inflation) and non-price factors (such as product quality and design, marketing and 
consumer after-sales service). Wages, or even unit labour costs, are just one element among 
many, and many researchers have warned against taking unit labour costs as a comprehensive 
measure of competitiveness (Ark et al. 2005). 
 
Minimum wages may as well have an effect on inflation, since companies employing minimum 
wage workers may adjust its prices upwards following a minimum wage hike. The effect would 
not be across the board, but would concentrate on the industries that employ minimum wage 
workers, and hence would alter the price structure in ways which are difficult to predict. And 
indirectly, it may end up having cascading effects on other industries, even in those not directly 
                                                     
9
 EUCO 10/1/11 “The Euro Plus Pact: Stronger Economic Policy Coordination for Competitiveness and 
Convergence”, Brussels, 20 April 2011.Conclusions from the 24/25 March 2011 European Council. The 
Euro Plus Pact was agreed by the euro area Heads of State or government and joined by Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. 
10
 More concretely, the Euro Plus Pact states: “To assess whether wages are evolving in line with 
productivity, unit labour costs (ULC) will be monitored over a period of time, by comparing with 
developments in other Euro area countries and in the main comparable trading partners. For each country, 
ULCs will be assessed for the economy as a whole and for each major sector (manufacturing; services; as 
well as tradable and non-tradable sectors). Large and sustained increases may lead to the erosion of 
competitiveness, especially if combined with a widening current account deficit and declining market 
shares for exports.” 
11
 A counter-argument would be that a wage increase in the non-traded sector may exert pressure on wages 
in the traded sectors. In the next section we will discuss these spill-over effects in the context of industrial 
relations systems.  
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employing low-paid workers, since the input of certain industries is the output of others. To what 
extent this would be a problem is open to interpretation and depends as well on the general 
economic conditions: some have argued that in a context of crisis such as the current one, 
minimum wages can be used as a tool against deflation (Herr and Kazandziska 2011). 
 
As we have already mentioned, some argue that minimum wages foster productivity and 
efficiency (Kaufman 2009). On the one hand, they can increase the incentive to work and the 
motivation of employees, as well as reduce turnover (Card 1995). On the other hand, by acting as 
a “beneficial constraint” for employers, they make it difficult to choose a low-cost competitive 
strategy, fostering efficiency and innovation (Brosnan and Wilkinson 1988; Kleinknecht 1998). 
Although such link has been difficult to establish empirically, some recent studies in the UK have 
been able to identify it, especially in large firms (Croucher and Rizov 2011; Riley and Bondibene 
2013). 
 
Other economic effects of a minimum wage increase that are mentioned in the literature are 
demand stimulation (even if an increase of minimum wage is just a redistribution of income from 
profits to wages, it would increase aggregate demand and output because low-wage earners have 
a higher propensity to consume; see Herr and Kazandziska 2011, also Stockhammer 2011) and 
reduced welfare spending (since it increases the income of the lowest paid, it reduces the need for 
redistributive and welfare programs for those groups –some argue that this amounts to ensuring 
that employers pay the full social costs of low paid employment, rather than subsidizing low-paid 
jobs as do other forms of redistribution; see Freeman 1996, Kaufman 2009). 
 
Interaction between minimum wages and industrial relations 
 
Of course, minimum wages do not exist in a vacuum. They interact with other wage-setting 
institutions, most importantly with collective bargaining, in ways that crucially determine their 
final impact on employment, inequality, and all the other aspects we have been discussing 
(Grimshaw, Bosch and Rubery 2013; Lee 2012). Some of the literature, particularly the 
mainstream economic one, often disregards such interaction, though modern institutionalist and 
heterodox approaches do bring this aspect to the fore (see the contributions to Grimshaw 2013; 
also to Vaughan-Whitehead 2010). It is particularly important to take this issue into account when 
evaluating the possibility of coordinating minimum wage policy across Europe, because the wide 
differences in industrial relations systems may lead to very different outcomes for the very same 
minimum wage policy.
12
 
 
Although minimum wages have a direct effect only on those workers whose wages fall below the 
specified threshold, they often have an indirect effect on wages above the threshold, which can 
extend to a sizeable part of the lower half of the earnings distribution (Freeman 1996). These 
“ripple” or “spill-over” effects exist because the minimum wage level is often used as a reference 
in individual or collective wage negotiations at the bottom of the wage distribution, with workers 
often aiming at maintaining their relative distance to the threshold. Sometimes, these ripple 
                                                     
12
In fact, as we already mentioned, in countries without a strong industrial relations tradition, in which 
unions were not strong enough to establish a functioning collective bargaining structure, statutory 
minimum wages were introduced to ensure an adequate minimum standard. In countries with strong 
industrial relations and efficient bargaining structures, wage floors were established directly by collective 
agreement, without need of government intervention. In other words, statutory minimum wages can be 
understood as a substitute for effective collective bargaining. 
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effects can have a bigger impact on the wage distribution at the bottom than the minimum wage 
increase on its own. The relative strength of collective bargaining in the different countries is one 
of the main determinants of the existence and scale of these ripple effects (Grimshaw, Bosch and 
Rubery 2013): where collective bargaining is very weak, it may not be able to capitalize on a 
minimum wage increase to facilitate a more or less general increase of wages in the low-paid 
sector. In this case, an increase in the minimum wage would simply compress wage distribution 
at the bottom, which can lead to some undesirable results such as excessively flat earnings 
trajectories in the low-paid sectors (generating a “low-wage trap”; Gautie 2010). Where collective 
bargaining is stronger, an increase in the minimum wage level can lead to a more or less 
generalized expansion of wages in the low-paid sectors, multiplying its effects in terms of pay 
equity, etc. 
 
But this interaction is made even more complicated by the fact that minimum wages can also 
have an effect on the strength and structure of the collective bargaining system. Some researchers 
have argued that high statutory minimum wages can have a “crowding out” effect on collective 
bargaining in the low-pay sector (Aghion et al. 2008), by reducing both the need and the incentive 
to engage in collective bargaining for setting wages (which may apply both to workers and 
employers). To the extent that this argument is based on the empirical correlation between 
statutory minimum wages and the strength of collective bargaining, it may inadvertently reverse 
causation: as we have already said, statutory minimum wages have often been introduced as a 
substitute for ineffective collective bargaining, and hence the observed correlation may be 
explained in exactly the opposite way (weak collective bargaining leads to statutory minimum 
wages, and not the other way round). Still, some empirical evidence does suggest (though not 
prove) the possibility of “crowding out” effects, and the reticence of unions against statutory 
minimum wages in some European countries is partly based on their own perception of this 
possibility (Eldring and Alsos 2012), so it is something that must be taken into account. 
 
 
2. Debate on the EU minimum wage policy 
In principle, the EU has no competences with respect to wage levels or wage formation 
mechanisms. The article 153 of the Lisbon Treaty, which deals with the EU attributions with 
respect to work and employment (including the areas of working conditions, health and safety, 
social security and employment protection), finishes with a sentence (point 5) which succinctly 
says “the provisions of this article shall not apply to pay”. According to this, the level and 
mechanisms for establishing minimum wages are a matter of member states. 
 
That does not mean that the issue of minimum wages has never concerned EU institutions. For 
instance, the European Parliament has repeatedly expressed its concern about low pay and 
minimum wage levels across Europe, in some occasions (as we will see later) even explicitly 
asking member states to ensure that minimum wage levels reach at least a certain percentage of 
the average or median national wages (normally, 50 or 60%). But the Commission has not 
attempted to transform such concerns into some form of soft or hard regulation, on the basis of 
the explicit exclusion of wages from EU competences in the treaties.  
 
But the current economic crisis has changed the situation in this respect. Under the assumption 
that the crisis in the periphery was largely a problem of competitiveness that could only be 
resolved through wage reductions (internal devaluations) and structural reforms, and with 
European support for strained public finances acting as a disciplinary device, European 
institutions (most importantly, the Commission and the Central Bank) have been increasingly 
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intervening in wage developments and wage formation mechanisms.
13
 Furthermore, such 
interventions have been reinforced by recent intergovernmental pacts (Six Pack, Euro Plus Pact) 
that, aside from committing countries to strict financial rules in the short and long term, explicitly 
include a compromise with austere wage developments and wage decentralization. 
 
So even though the treaties still exclude wages from EU competences, the crisis has made wages 
(both their development and the mechanisms of their formation) one of the central targets of EU 
policy-making. This is surely one of the reasons why the debate on establishing more explicit 
mechanisms of wage policy coordination, in particular with respect to minimum wage levels, is 
currently re-emerging in European policy
14
 and academic
15
 circles.  In this section, we will make 
a brief review of such debate. First, we will revise its history. Then, we will discuss the different 
modes of coordination that are being discussed. 
 
A brief history of the debate 
 
In the early stages of the European project, the main concern was the establishment of a common 
market, and employment and social issues remained squarely at the national level. But from the 
sixties until the nineties, the competences of EU institutions in social and employment issues 
expanded considerably, and there were even some attempts at wage coordination, including 
minimum wages. The 1961 European Social Charter of the Council of Europe
16
 established the 
right of workers to a fair remuneration for a decent standard of living, and the Council's European 
Committee of Social Rights put forward some definitions on what decent wages could be in the 
1970s and 1990s.
17
 Following the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for 
                                                     
13
 The countries receiving EU bailouts had to sign memorandums that often included reductions of 
minimum wage levels, public pay levels and decentralizing reforms of the collective bargaining systems 
(Busch et al. 2013). For instance, the 2010 Memorandum of Understanding with Ireland states that “the 
government will  introduce legislation to reform the minimum wage in such a way as to foster job creation 
notably for categories at higher risk of unemployment and prevent distortions of wage conditions across 
sectors associated with the presence of sectoral minimum wages in addition to the national minimum 
wage”, as well as reduce it by 1% in nominal terms (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/
eu_economic_situation/pdf/2010-12-07-mou_en.pdf). Similar provisions can be found in the 
Memorandums for Greece and Portugal (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/
occasional_paper/2010/pdf/ocp61_en.pdf, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/mou/2011-
05-18-mou-portugal_en.pdf). 
14
 In recent years, some very prominent European policymakers have floated the idea. For example, the 
head of the group of euro-area finance ministers, Jean-Claude Juncker, considered “indispensable to agree 
on a European legal minimum wage”, in January 2013 (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-
10/juncker-says-euro-area-countries-need-common-minimum-wage.html). A bit earlier, László Andor, the 
EU commissioner in charge of social and employment affairs, also suggested the introduction of minimum 
wages across Europe (http://www.euractiv.com/socialeurope/brussels-push-eu-wide-minimum-wa-news-
512189). 
15
 The origins of this debate can be traced back to Schulten et al 2005. More recent contributions include 
Schulten 2012, Eldring and Alsos 2012. 
16
 The Council of Europe is an international organization including 47 European countries, not an EU body. 
17
 In the 1970's, it stated that they should be at least 68% of the national average gross wage, while in the 
second half of the 1990's the threshold of 60% of the national average net wage was proposed. The change 
from a gross to a net definition of decent wages was very criticized because bringing tax and benefit 
systems complicates the picture and because it places the responsibility to provide adequate levels of wages  
in the State instead of the employers (Lorcher 2006; Murray 2004). 
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Workers in 1989, which included the right to an "equitable wage", the European Commission and 
Parliament made some proposals that can be seen as early attempts to coordinate national 
minimum wages at the European level (Eldring and Alsos 2012). In 1993, the European 
Commission asked member states to "take appropriate measures to ensure that the right to an 
equitable wage is protected" (Opinion on an Equitable Wage, 19OJC 248, 11 September 1993 ), 
while a report from the European Parliament encouraged them "to establish a minimum wage 
which amounts to a certain proportion of the national average wage" (Schulten 2008). But 
because of resistance from several member states, the idea was more or less abandoned by the 
second half of the 1990s, which explains the explicit exclusion of wages from EU competencies 
in the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon, or the lack of any mention to wages in the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
 
The debate on minimum wage coordination resurfaced around the second half of the first decade 
of the new millennium, first related to the EU enlargements and concerns with their impact on 
low wages and social dumping, and then (more strongly) in the context of the economic crisis and 
the already mentioned de facto increasing levels of wage coordination.
18
 In 2007, the European 
Parliament stated that "the minimum wage is set very low or at below subsistence level" in many 
European countries (European Parliament 2007) and in the following year called on the Council 
"to agree an EU target for minimum wages...to provide for remuneration of at least 60 percent of 
the relevant...average wage" (European Parliament 2008), asking later on the European 
Commission to study the impact that the introduction of a minimum income at the EU level 
would have in each country.
19
 As previously mentioned, also the Commission has recently 
expressed interest in this matter.
20
 
 
However, some key European actors remain reluctant to the coordination of minimum wage 
policy. On the one hand, Nordic member states and more in general countries where minimum 
wages are set up by collective bargaining rather than statutory regulation have traditionally 
opposed the idea, considering that it may undermine the existing national wage setting 
mechanisms. Germany used to belong to this category, but a more or less general dissatisfaction 
with the results of the current minimum wage setting mechanisms has led to a shift towards the 
statutory model, which may happen soon.
21
 On the other hand, European social partners have also 
sometimes opposed the idea of an EU minimum wage policy, defending the need to respect 
national specificities in wage-setting mechanisms as well as national and social partners 
sovereignty. Nonetheless, the European trade union movement seems to be shifting its position, 
having recently recommended that “where it exists the effective national minimum wage should 
be at least equal to 50% of the average wage or 60% of the median wage” (ETUC 2012) -
although it certainly does not recommend extending the statutory model to countries where 
minimum wages are collectively agreed. European employers have argued that minimum wages 
should remain a responsibility of member states according to the subsidiarity principle (Business 
Europe 2012).  
                                                     
18
 The EU-level debate also echoes the debate in some countries on this matter in recent years, particularly 
in Germany (see box X). 
19
 “The Commission should study the impact which a legislative proposal it might submit concerning the 
introduction of an adequate minimum income at European level would have in each Member State; 
suggests, in particular, that any such study should examine the difference between the adequate minimum 
income and the minimum wage in the Member State concerned” (European Parliament, 2010). 
20
 See for instance the 2012 Employment and Social Developments Report (EC 2012). See also note 10 
above.  
21
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2013/03/articles/de1303019i.htm  
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What type of coordination? 
 
There would be many possible ways to coordinate European minimum wage policies, and even 
the defenders of this idea often have different opinions in this respect. To discuss such 
possibilities, we will focus on three main axes of coordination: 1) the mode of regulation 
(basically, hard vs. soft law in EU terminology); 2) the extent of coordination (levels vs. 
systems); and 3) the definition of target levels (a proportion of median or average wages, GDP 
per capita, or others). 
 
1. The mode of regulation. Several of the proponents of the idea of an EU minimum wage policy 
(for instance, Schulten 2008) have argued that the coordination could be carried out using the 
mechanisms of “soft law” that have been applied in recent years for the coordination of 
employment and social policies in Europe, what in EU terminology is called “Open Method of 
Coordination”. The OMC basically consist in a commitment to broadly defined European 
objectives by member states, which have then to develop nationally specific action plans, with 
progress towards the objectives being periodically reviewed through commonly agreed indicators, 
and a common discussion of results with the aim of spreading best practices and common 
learning and improving.
22
 
 
Considering the important existing differences in national minimum wage systems, it has been 
argued that the OMC provides “a very practicable way to introduce a European minimum wage 
policy” (Schulten 2008: 431). Some have argued, though, that the OMC has delivered few results 
in terms of actual policy coordination and harmonization (its explicit goals), since the lack of any 
type of enforcement mechanism renders it ineffective in practice (for a review, see Borras and 
Radaelli 2010). A “hard” form of regulation, ie. a directive, would surely be more effective, but 
since pay is currently explicitly excluded from the treaties it can only be considered in the long 
run (it would require changing the treaties), and it would involve a considerably higher degree of 
harmonization, which may be opposed by many countries and EU actors, as mentioned in the 
previous section.
23
 
 
2. The extent of coordination. Most proposals for an EU minimum wage policy refer to a 
common target level (for instance, a proportion of average wages), without mentioning the 
institutional mechanisms that should bring about such minimum pay level in each country. In 
fact, some of the proposals explicitly argue that the system for setting out the minimum level 
should be decided by each country according to its own institutional and industrial relations 
traditions. What this would imply is that countries where minimum wages are set up by collective 
agreement could maintain such system, only adopting the compromise to ensure that it is at least 
as high as the common target.  
 
                                                     
22
 For more details, see 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/open_method_coordination_en.htm. 
23
 Since the treaties exclude so explicitly wages from the remit of EU institutions, in fact it is not clear 
whether they would allow for even the type of soft coordination associated with OMC. Probably, other 
options for voluntary and “soft” coordination would have to be explored, such as autonomous agreements 
concluded by the EU social partners 
(www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/autonomousagreement.htm). 
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Although that would make the policy much more feasible on the face of the existing diversity, 
there would be some problems. First, a minimum wage system purely established by collective 
agreements (such as the one in Sweden or Denmark) leaves uncovered some workers (those not 
covered by collective agreements). If the common target level is defined as a minimum for all 
workers, it may require the extension of collective agreements or the establishment of some kind 
of second-level statutory floor. In both cases, this would imply an important change in the 
existing industrial relations practices, with a higher degree of state intervention.  
 
Taking this a step further, the EU coordination could aim at harmonizing not only levels, but also 
systems, requiring that below the collectively agreed minimum wages (which are generally 
higher) there would be a statutory minimum threshold corresponding to the EU target. If this 
would be the case, the impact of coordination would differ considerably across Europe: in the 
countries which currently have statutory minimum wages, only the level would change, not the 
system; in the countries where they are collectively agreed, the system itself would have to 
change, and therefore the institutional impact would be more significant (we will discuss this in 
more detail in the following section). It is important to note that even in the latter case, the 
statutory minimum wage would not (necessarily) replace the collectively bargained level, but 
supplement it by setting an absolute minimum covering the whole workforce (in other words, 
nothing would prevent social partners agreeing higher minima for specific sectors, etc). 
 
3. The definition of target levels. A final important aspect in which current proposals differ is in 
how the target levels should be defined. The most frequently mentioned is a proportion of median 
or average wages, normally 50 or 60% (for instance, the EU Parliament has mentioned a level of 
60% of the median; ETUC 50% of the average or 60% of the median; Schulten 60% of the 
median, etc., refs.). Other proposals anchor the target to GDP per capita (o per worker) rather 
than to wages (for instance, the proposal by Rasmussen and Delors 2006).  
 
The choice of the target level is obviously not trivial, since it has important distributional 
implications and imply different interpretations of what would be a fair distribution of income. 
For instance, anchoring the minimum level to the median wage (the wage that occupies the 
middle position of the distribution in each country) makes it insensitive to developments at the 
very high end of the wage distribution, which is precisely where most recent changes in wage 
inequality have taken place as we saw in the previous section (the recent increases in inequality 
are mostly due to a disproportional increase of wages at the top tail of the distribution). In other 
words, using the median as reference could mean that even with a massive growth in overall 
income, if all such growth is located in the upper tail of the distribution, the minimum wage level 
would not change. Using the average rather than the median as the anchor would solve this 
problem, ensuring that the minimum wage level would be sensitive to changes in the upper tail 
(in general, when using the average as reference, the target levels proposed tends to be lower, 
since the average is usually significantly higher).  
 
Using as the reference GDP per capita or per worker, on the other hand, has the advantage of 
linking the minimum wage to the evolution of overall productivity in the country, irrespective of 
whether such evolution is reflected in the structure of wages. GDP per worker is a more adequate 
measure of productivity in this respect, but in the context of a crisis and rising unemployment, it 
could lead to difficult to defend increases in minimum wage levels. Of course, a final option 
would be to have no target level at all, but just some type of EU-level council (similar to the UK 
Low Pay Commission) that would adjust the target on a yearly basis, depending on their own 
evaluation of the economic and social situation. 
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Box 1: Arguments in favor and against of a coordinated EU minimum wage policy 
 
With respect to the arguments in favor and against establishing a common EU minimum wage 
threshold, we can differentiate them at three levels: 1) those associated with an increase in 
minimum wage levels, which mostly concern the countries which already have statutory 
minimum wage systems (in nearly all of them, the level is currently below the hypothetical 
scenario of 60% of the median); 2) those associated with the introduction of a statutory wage 
floor or something similar, which mostly concern the countries which currently establish their 
minimum wages through collective bargaining; 3) those associated with the coordination of 
minimum wage policy as such, which concerns the EU as a whole. The following table outlines 
the main arguments at each of those three levels (for more details, see sections 1 and 2 of this 
report). 
 
Some relevant references: (1) Freeman 1996; (2) Card 1995, Teulings 2003; (3) Kaufmann 2009; (4) Herr and 
Kazandziska 2011; (5) Herr and Kazandziska 2011; (6) Freeman 1996, Kaufman 2009; (7) Brown, Gilroy and Kohen 
1982; (8) Abbot 2012; (9) Gautié 2010; (10) policy debate, see Dostal 2012 for Germany, Eldring and Alsos 2012 for a 
Nordic perspective; (11) see Schulten 2008 & 2012 for an academic perspective,  section 2 of this report for the policy 
debate. 
 
 
Related to: Arguments in favor Arguments against 
1. Increasing MW 
levels (countries 
with statutory 
MW systems) 
 
-Increases the standard of living of 
the lowest wage earners 
(1)
 
-Reduces wage inequality (overall 
and linked to disadvantaged groups, 
such as women or migrants) 
(2)
 
-Increases motivation of low-paid 
workers and incentive to innovate 
in low-skilled sectors 
(3)
 
-Boosts overall demand, since low 
earners have a higher propensity to 
consume 
(4)
 
-Serves as an anchor against 
deflation in times of crisis 
(5)
 
-Reduces poverty and state 
expenditure 
(6)
 
-Generates disemployment effects, 
especially among the youngest and 
least skilled workers 
(7)
 
-Hampers the competitiveness of firms 
in the low-paid sectors 
(8)
 
-Can generate low-wage traps, 
excessively flat earnings trajectories 
for low-skilled workers 
(9)
 
2. Introducing a 
statutory wage 
floor (countries 
without statutory 
MW systems) 
(10)
 
-Expands coverage of the minimum 
wage provisions, making it 
comprehensive 
-Reduces social exclusion and 
labour segmentation 
-Undermine existing collective 
bargaining systems 
-May have a knock-down effect on low 
wages (by deincentivising wage 
bargaining) 
-Crowding out effect on collective 
bargaining 
3. Coordinating 
MW policy at the 
EU level 
(11)
 
-Multiplies the demand boost by 
making it simultaneous across the 
EU 
-Minimizes the negative effects on 
competitiveness (simultaneous 
increase in main trade partners) and 
employment (demand boost) 
-Limits some problems of market 
integration, such as social dumping 
and race to the bottom 
-Important step of European 
integration, embodiment of the 
European Social Model 
-Need to change existing treaties, 
political difficulties 
-Undermining of industrial relations 
tradition of some countries 
-Unpredictable institutional 
interactions in different countries 
-Difficulty to adapt a single policy to 
national needs and specificities 
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3. Varieties of minimum wage systems in Europe and the difficulties of 
coordination 
 
The main difficulty for the coordination of minimum wages in the European Union is the wide 
diversity across countries in the existing systems. As we have already mentioned several times, 
the main divide in this respect is between countries where minimum wages are set by government 
regulation (the statutory model) and countries where minimum wages are set by collective 
bargaining. But even within each of those two sets of countries there are further elements of 
differentiation that could be a complicating factor in any attempt of policy coordination. The 
following points summarize these elements of differentiation and how they may difficult EU 
coordination, broadly classifying countries along each axis: 
 
1. Degree of social partner involvement. Although in nearly all cases there is some degree 
of social partner involvement (the only possible exception is Hungary; see Schulten 2012: 
90), it varies considerably between countries. Of course, the highest level of involvement 
is in the countries where minimum wages are set by collective bargaining, with no (or 
very little) government intervention: this is the case in the Nordic countries, Germany, 
Austria and Italy. In some of these countries, there is in fact some marginal intervention 
of the government, either to extend the coverage of collective agreements in some cases 
(Finland and Germany) or to establish some kind of statutory legal minimum in some 
particular cases (Austria and Italy).  
 
A second level of involvement is in the countries where there are national minimum 
wages but they are set by national level collective agreements, bipartite (Belgium, 
Estonia and Greece) or tripartite (Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia). This category is really 
a hybrid: as in the statutory model, there is a single minimum wage level, and the 
intervention of the government is crucial for transforming what has been agreed into 
binding regulation (and often, the government can have the final word in if the social 
partners cannot reach an agreement); as in the collectively bargained model, it is the 
agreement of social partners what determines the threshold.  
 
A last group of countries (the rest) would have minimum wages set directly by the 
government, though in most cases social partners are consulted (often, they are formally 
part of some type of advisory body which recommends adjustments to the minimum 
wage on a regular basis, such as the well-known UK Low Pay Commission).  
 
The coordination of minimum wage policy would be easier in the third group of countries 
(the statutory model), because the complexity of the system and the number of actors 
involved is smaller (it would just require a commitment of the governments to gradually 
move towards the EU agreed framework); in the second group (the nationally agreed 
model), the degree of institutional disruption would be higher, since moving towards a 
common EU threshold would diminish the role of social partners in the setting of 
minimum wages; but the highest degree of institutional disruption and difficulties would 
be in the first case, because either it would involve a shift towards a kind of second-level 
statutory model (which would underlie the collectively agreed system) or it would require 
a commitment with the EU target from all the partners involved, at all levels. 
 
2. Universal vs. segmented wage floors. Although in most cases, this second 
differentiation is linked to the previous one, it is conceptually distinct. In the countries 
with collectively agreed minimum wages, they tend to be sector- or even company-
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specific, whereas most of the countries with statutory minimum wage systems tend to 
have a single universal wage floor
24
 (although there may be some exceptions or sub-
minima, as we will see in the following point). Cyprus is a somewhat hybrid case, 
because it has an occupation-specific statutory minimum wage underlying the 
collectively agreed levels (Soumeli 2011). As far as we know, none of the proposals of 
EU minimum wage coordination mentions the possibility of differentiating by sector or 
occupation, and therefore we can assume that it would be a universal threshold within 
each country. Therefore, this is a second axis of institutional difficulty for the countries 
where minimum wages are set by collective agreement, which would have to move from 
sector-specific thresholds to a single universal wage floor (for the countries with a 
statutory system, this would be no problem). 
 
3. Scope. Even in the countries with statutory national minimum wages, there are often 
provisions allowing sub-minima for specific groups, or even exclusions. But again, the 
most important difference in the scope of minimum wages is associated with the divide 
between the statutory and collectively agreed models. In the pure collectively agreed 
model, only the workers covered by collective agreements are affected by the minimum 
wages: although most of these countries have very high levels of collective bargaining 
coverage (above 80%), in some cases (such as Germany) the coverage is much lower 
(around 60%), which leaves many workers unprotected. In some of the countries with the 
collectively agreed model, they solve this problem (at least partly) by different means, 
such as extending the collective agreement if half of the industry is covered (in Finland) 
or making it an obligation to be member of an employer organization (in Austria). In the 
statutory system, on the other hand, the coverage tends to be comprehensive but often 
allows sub-minima for specific categories, typically young workers (in all countries 
except Portugal and Spain) and/or apprentices. There are other types of differentiation in 
particular cases, such as for disability in France or Portugal, for unskilled workers in 
Luxembourg or for managers and unmarried workers in Greece (Eldring and Alsos 
2012).  
 
Assuming that the EU policy would require a universal wage floor, perhaps with a 
subminimum for young workers (as already exists in most countries), the biggest changes 
would again take place in the countries where minimum wages are set by collective 
agreement, because it would mean a significant expansion of coverage; for countries with 
the statutory system, it may require eliminating some national specificities in some cases, 
but it would probably not have a very large impact. 
 
4. Enforcement. Obviously, if there are wide differences in the degree of enforcement of 
the minimum wage provisions, the institutional difficulties of EU-wide coordination 
would increase considerably. Although some relatively well-known facts (the differences 
in the size of the informal sector or the existence of bogus self-employment) do point to 
differences in enforcement across Europe, there is no reliable source of comparable data 
for this matter, so it is really difficult to evaluate in this context. Drawing on Eurofound’s 
Network of Correspondents,
25
 we have compiled some exploratory information on this 
issue. 
 
                                                     
24
 In some countries, there is also some regional differentiation (for instance, in Bulgaria and Finland). 
25
 The information used for this section comes from the forthcoming Eurofound publication “Pay 
developments into the 21st century, Comparative Analytical Report. 
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The enforcement of minimum wage levels is a legal requirement which obviously 
depends on the judiciary system (once an employee reports a violation of employment 
regulation) and on the monitoring capacity of each country, typically through labour 
inspections. Data on non-compliance is rare also at the national level and has been 
publicly documented only in some countries: Ireland (based on 1,169 inspections in 2011, 
more than 100 cases of pay breaches were found);   UK (around 1% of the labour force 
was estimated to be earning wages below the national minimum wage in 2010, according 
to estimates from the Office for National Statistics); Poland (3% of employers under 
inspection paid wages below the minimum wage in 2003); and Netherlands (only 0.3% of 
the employees earned less than the legal minimum wage they were entitled to according 
to a study in 2006). Several factors influence the potential amount of people paid under 
legal requirements. In countries where many employees are paid at around minimum 
wage levels, the probabilities to find underpaid workers may be higher. For instance, in 
Spain less than 1% of employees were paid minimum wages in the period 2004-2009, 
which may suggest few people should be paid under minimum wage levels. Nevertheless, 
another potential factor is the size of the black economy, where the minimum wage is less 
likely to be observed. Several countries report cases where employment relationships take 
place between parties not bound by employment contracts, such as  Romania and 
Bulgaria, where the share of employees without a labour contract was estimated at 3% in 
2012 (from 6% in 2003). Illegal practices typically concentrate in certain branches such 
as construction, catering, retail or repair (as reported in the Czech Republic or France, 
where some cases in large retail companies occurred). Moreover, a specially vulnerable 
group may be migrant workers, typically in the construction sector (as reported in The 
Netherlands, Finland and Belgium). A further issue of concern reported in some countries 
(Hungary or Lithuania) is part-time working, since employees may be in fact working 
longer hours than those stated in their contracts.
26
 
 
Of course, a very important axis of divergence across Europe, that would have a very significant 
impact as well on the difficulty of establishing a coordinated EU minimum wage policy, is the 
current levels and their distance to the hypothetical common target. But that particular point will 
be analised in detail in the next section, so we will not discuss it here. 
 
So in terms of the institutional difficulty, or potential institutional impact of EU minimum wage 
coordination, we can summarize by dividing the countries in three categories: 
 
1. High degree of institutional impact or difficulty: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Austria, 
Germany and Italy. These are the countries with collectively agreed minimum wages, and 
there are superimposed difficulties across most of the axes previously mentioned: the 
discussed policy could involve a disruption of national industrial relations traditions or 
require a high degree of coordination from all economic actors; it would probably 
eliminate existing sector and company differentials with respect to minimum wage levels; 
and it would expand the coverage to make it universal. 
2. Intermediate degree of institutional impact or difficulty: Belgium, Estonia, Poland, 
Bulgaria, Slovakia, Greece and Cyprus. Most of these countries have also collectively 
agreed minimum wages, although at the national level and with universal coverage, and 
                                                     
26
 A final point to note with respect of enforcement is that it can be itself affected by the system and scope 
of the minimum wage regulation: a single universal wage floor facilitates enforcement. For instance, in the 
German case it has been argued that the existence of very different levels across sectors and firms 
complicates enforcement significantly (Bosch and Weiskopf 2011). 
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therefore occupy an intermediate position with respect to the rest of Europe. Cyprus is a 
peculiar case, with an underlying occupation-specific statutory minimum wage for some 
cases and collectively agreed minimum wages. 
3. Low degree of institutional impact or difficulty: France, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, UK, Ireland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, 
Slovenia and Malta. In these countries, minimum wages are set by government regulation 
and have more or less universal coverage, and therefore the EU coordination would be 
considerably simpler than in the previous cases (though of course, not irrelevant). 
 
A final point to be made is that this differentiation of countries according to the institutional 
difficulty of establishing a coordinated EU minimum wage policy would also be relevant if such 
policy is implemented by “soft law”. Although that would require less institutional change in the 
countries with collectively agreed minimum wages (the existing diversity of systems could be 
kept almost totally intact: each country could move towards a commonly agreed target through its 
own means), it would certainly be easier to achieve in countries with a statutory system, since it 
would just be a matter for the government to adapt the necessary regulation (whereas in the 
countries with collectively agreed minimum wages it would require a commitment from many 
different actors and a considerable degree of coordination at the country level itself). 
 
Box 2: The debate on minimum wage in Germany 
 
Since the mid-1990, the low-paid sector seems to have grown significantly in Germany, reaching more than 
20% of the employed population according to recent estimates (Kalina and Weinkopf 2010). This is linked 
to the development of minimum wage systems after the reunification, with rapidly declining coverage rates 
and weaker collective bargaining structures (Bosch and Weinkopf 2012).  
 
Against this background, in 2005 the grand coalition (Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union 
of Bavaria and Social Democratic Party) created two procedures by which industry-specific (binding) 
minimum wages could be created. But there has been little progress, especially in industries without 
collective bargaining or with low coverage. As a consequence, different minimum wages coexist with large 
segments of the workforce not covered by any minimum rate: coverage of employees by industry-wide 
collective wage agreements in was 56% in West Germany and 37% in East Germany in 2010 (IAB 2011). 
Since company-level agreements covered a small proportion of employees (7% in the West and 13% in the 
East), 37% of employees in the West and 51% in the East are not covered by collective agreement.  This 
explains why the debate over the establishment of a statutory minimum wage is gaining momentum in 
Germany in recent years.  
 
 
Part 2: A simple accounting exercise 
 
4. Methodology 
 
The key objective of this “accounting exercise” will be to try to quantify the number of workers 
that are currently below the threshold established by a hypothetical common EU minimum wage 
policy (EUMW from now on) that we will fix at 60% of the median wage in each member state, 
and to identify the types of companies, jobs and individuals that would be most affected. For 
carrying out such an exercise, we will use the two main existing EU-wide surveys on income and 
wages, the 2010 European Survey on Income and Living Conditions and the 2010 European 
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Earnings Structure Survey. In this section, we will document the main methodological decisions 
that we had to make in order to carry out our analysis, and the limitations imposed by the data. 
 
4. a. Some definitions 
 
Normally, the threshold established by minimum wages refers to gross earnings before taxes or 
other statutory deductions, including not only the base salary but also premia and bonuses, except 
if they refer to non-standard work hours or overtime, and excluding payments in kind (OECD 
2003). It is normally defined in terms of an hourly rate, or monthly earnings adjusted for hours 
worked (so that equivalents for different working hours can be computed). These are the 
attributes that should characterize our target measure of wages, upon which the common EU 
threshold shall be defined. But of course, our analysis will be constrained by the characteristics of 
the data available, and the actual measures of wages we use will not be identical to this definition. 
In the following pages, we will provide details of any departure from such definition, and their 
potential implications. 
 
The key element of all the analysis in this paper is the identification of the wage level that 
correspond to 60% of the median in each country, and of the workers that fall below such 
threshold. In this respect, we simply use the most commonly used threshold in the literature, 
which roughly corresponds as well with one of the most widely used definitions of low-paid 
workers
27
 (so we can say that establishing such a threshold would mean the statutory elimination 
of low-paid work in Europe, at least according to a common definition). The use of the median 
rather than the mean is normally justified by the excessive sensitivity of the latter to outliers in 
the distribution of income. Relatively few very high individual earnings can skew upwards the 
mean and therefore lead to an very high threshold: in fact, when a minimum wage threshold is 
proposed with reference to the mean it tends to be lower than when it is proposed with reference 
to the median
28
 (50 or 55% rather than 60%). In a recent proposal, ETUC defended taking both 
into account (ie, either 60% of the median or 55% of the mean, whichever is highest), which has 
interesting implications (after all, it could be argued that the minimum wage level should take 
into account the existence of very high wages, even if they can statistically be considered as 
outliers). In any case, in this paper, we will follow the most frequent approximation based on the 
median, both for reasons of simplicity and for its superior statistical robustness (the precision in 
the measure of high wages is always much smaller, so it is better to use an approach that is less 
affected by them). 
 
4. b. The European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 
 
The EU-SILC is a cross-sectional and longitudinal database on income, poverty, social exclusion 
and living conditions in the EU, which is coordinated by EUROSTAT drawing from different 
sources at the national level. It is representative of all private households and their current 
members residing in the territory of the countries at the time of data collection. It is a very rich 
source in terms of the information it contains, it has a reasonably big sample and it has the 
                                                     
27
 For instance, the OECD defines low-pay as two-thirds of the median. 
28
 Another important problem of using the mean as reference is that it would change by the establishment of 
such minimum wage ipso facto, leading to a spiral of ever-increasing wages for purely mathematical 
reasons. The median is not mathematically increased by increasing the wage floor, although it may in 
practice go up as well for spillover effects. 
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advantage of incorporating both a longitudinal perspective and a household perspective, on top of 
the more usual individual cross-sectional perspective. The main problem that this source has for 
our purposes is that it is not really aimed at measuring wages as such, but income coming from 
employment at the individual and household level. Therefore, with the EU-SILC we cannot 
construct a measure of wages that matches completely the definition given above, but only an 
approximation that requires making some non-trivial assumptions. 
 
The variable on labour income in EU-SILC refers to overall income from work in the previous 
calendar year, measured in gross terms (some countries, but not all, also provide net). Since we 
use the latest available cross-sectional wave from 2010, the income variable actually refers to 
2009. This variable poses the following problems for our purposes: 
 
1) It does not necessarily refer to a job in particular, since it measures any labour-related income. 
So in fact, it can come from more than one job if the respondent had more than one job in the 
previous year, either successively (ie, if she changed jobs) or simultaneously (ie, if she had 
multiple jobs). The share of employees with more than one job in the countries included in EU-
SILC in 2010 was 4.73% (ranging from nearly 9% in Poland to less than 2% in Bulgaria). The 
share of employees who changed jobs in the year used as reference for the income variables is 8% 
(ranging from 14% in the UK to 2% in Romania). So although this problem is not enormous, it 
can have significant implications for the results, which have to be taken into account. 
 
2) The survey collects some information about the current job which is necessary for our analysis 
(for instance, sector or occupation), but the current job does not necessarily coincide with the job 
or jobs to which the variable on labor income refers. As mentioned before, around 8% of 
employees changed jobs last year, and all of them are potentially affected by such discrepancy. 
 
3) A final important problem is that a significant proportion of responses is imputed, for different 
reasons (in some cases, it may be item non-response; in others, that the information is collected 
on a different basis) and through different procedures depending on the country. Although there is 
a variable that flags imputed values, it is not consistently coded, so it is very difficult to evaluate 
the implications of this problem (Brandolini et al. 2010). Nevertheless, this is a problem which is 
not specific to our analysis but which applies to anyone using EU-SILC data. 
 
To transform the EU-SILC variable of labour income into a variable fit for our purposes, we 
apply the following formula (based on Brandolini et al. 2010): 
 
                        
                          
                                                     
 
 
That is, our main variable will be monthly full-time equivalent gross wage, which equals the EU-
SILC variable of annual cash gross earnings (last year) divided by the number of months in full-
time jobs of the respondent over the same year plus the number of months in part-time jobs 
multiplied by a country-sex specific ratio of median hours of work in part-time jobs to median 
hours of work in full-time jobs.
29
 
 
To adjust for the potential bias introduced by workers that hold more than one job, we make a 
further adjustment to the previous figure by multiplying it for a ratio of the hours worked in the 
first job to the total hours of work (ie, in all jobs). This involves the assumption that the person 
                                                     
29
 This necessary adjustment for part-time work can produce some minor bias in countries where the hours 
of part-time work are highly spread (such as the UK), but it is highly unlikely to change the overall picture. 
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had the same work arrangements over the previous 12 months as she has now, which is not 
necessarily true but is reasonable (and unavoidable unless we prefer to ignore the problem of 
multiple job holders). No further adjustments are made to deal with the problem of workers that 
changed jobs over the reference period, because it is simply impossible to know how much of last 
year’s labour earnings can be attributed for each job. We do know how many months did they 
work (so we can exclude from the denominator the months in unemployment or inactivity), but not 
how many of them correspond to each job if they changed over the year. What this means is that 
for anyone that changed jobs last year (around 8% of the total sample, as previously mentioned), 
our base variable collects the average wage for all jobs over the last 12 months, which is a good 
approximation to the extent that those that changed jobs maintained a similar wage level.
30
 
 
4. c. The European Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) 
 
The European Union Structure of Earnings Survey has been conducted every four years since 
2002, and collects representative and harmonized data on wages in enterprises with more than 10 
employees in all sectors except agriculture, fishing, public administration, education, health and 
community and social services. The inclusion of small enterprises and the above mentioned 
sectors is optional for the participating countries, and in fact many of them opted for such 
comprehensive coverage in the last edition of the survey (2010), which is the one we will use 
here. Although the actual method for collecting the information can differ considerably across 
countries (between specific surveys and administrative registers), in all cases it is collected at the 
company level and based on payroll data (rather than on workers´ responses). The sample is 
representative of both enterprises and workers in the covered sectors and company sizes. 
 
The SES has many obvious advantages over the EU-SILC for our purposes, but it has some 
important problems too, which is why we will use it mostly as secondary source to complete the 
picture. Its main advantage is that it is a survey explicitly aimed at measuring wages with a high 
degree of detail, whereas EU-SILC measures labour income and only secondarily. What this 
means is that our target variable can be constructed in a much more direct and precise way, with 
very little need of resorting to heroic assumptions. The problem of multiple and changed jobs 
does not apply either, because the data refers to jobs rather than workers (even if someone had 
more than one job, the information would be correctly gathered for each of them). The sample is 
also considerably bigger in most countries, and the degree of imputation is in principle much 
smaller (although the documentation of the data does not say much about this explicitly). 
 
But on the other hand, it has the important problem of providing only a limited coverage of our 
target population (European Union workers). We only could only get access to SES data for 19 
countries of the EU.
31
 And furthermore, for some countries the SES does not include small 
enterprises nor many important sectors of the economy. The exclusion of small enterprises is 
specially problematic (affecting 7 of the 19 countries), because we know that low-paid workers 
are overrepresented in such companies. 
                                                     
30
 Using the longitudinal module of the EU-SILC, we could check directly how reasonable was this 
assumption, by comparing the wage in the previous and current year for those that changed and did not 
change jobs. The average wage increase of those that changed was only marginally above that of those that 
did not change (5.1% increase versus 5%). Furthermore, 55% of those that changed did so within the same 
2-digit occupation (in which case the increase in pay was even smaller); only for the remaining 45% (who 
changed job and occupation) was the increase in pay relatively significant (6.3% versus 5%). Overall, not 
adjusting for those that changed jobs is likely to lead to an inconsequential upwards bias, at most. 
31
 The unavailable countries were Germany, UK, Austria, Malta, Bulgaria, Greece, Denmark and Belgium. 
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The measure of wages that will serve as basis for our analysis is in this case very precise and 
corresponds more or less exactly with the target variable defined previously, according to the 
following formula: 
 
           
  
                                                                  
                                     
 
 
All variables except the monthly equivalent annual bonus refer to last month (adjusted for cases of 
partial unpaid absence). The monthly equivalent annual bonus is calculated as the total annual 
bonus received last year divided by the number of months worked last year.
32
 
 
Although the measure of wages in SES is much better, the impact of excluding significant 
segments of the economy is very important. On the one hand, it affects the calculation of the 
median hourly wage that serves for the definition of the threshold: to the extent that, for instance, 
the proportion of low-paid workers is larger in small firms, excluding them will tend to increase 
the median, and consequently the threshold (which on its own, would make it easier to fall below 
it). On the other hand, if there are more low-paid workers in small enterprises, excluding the latter 
would reduce the share of people falling below the threshold directly. Therefore, both effects may 
cancel out to some extent: but in practice, as we will see later, in most countries excluding small 
companies tends to reduce the proportion of workers falling below the 60% of the median 
threshold. 
 
 
5. Evaluating the impact of a hypothetical common EU minimum wage 
threshold 
 
5.a. How much change from existing minimum wage levels? 
 
A coordinated EU minimum wage policy would not start from scratch, but from the existing 
systems and levels of minimum wages in each member state. It is very important, therefore, that 
we start with by contextualizing the hypothetical common EU minimum wage with the existing 
arrangements in each member state. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the basic data that we will discuss in this section. The first column of both 
tables shows the existing levels of minimum wage (for 2009 and 2010, the base years for the two 
sources that we will be using). In the case of countries with statutory minimum wages, this 
information was obtained from Eurostat and has a simple and direct interpretation: these are the 
actual levels, in euros, below which no employment relation is permitted (though there may be 
exceptions). In the countries with collectively agreed minimum wages, the figures shown in the 
tables are just an approximation that we will use for comparative purposes, drawing on an 
estimation by Kampelmann, Garnero and Rycx (2013). In strict terms, there is not such a thing as 
a national monthly minimum wage in those countries, but rather different minimum wage levels 
in different sectors and/or occupations which do not necessarily apply to the full working 
                                                     
32
 Since SES data allows to calculate hourly wages with precision, there is no need to adjust for part-time 
work. 
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population. In the majority of literature on this issue, the effective levels of minimum wages in 
those countries are thus simply unknown, even if they do exist. In a recent paper, Kampelmann, 
Garnero and Rycx
33
 gather data from sectoral agreed minimum wages for those countries, and 
estimate an average effective minimum wage level for the workers covered by collective 
bargaining.
34
 Even if such information has to be handled with care because of the reasons 
mentioned, it is extremely useful for comparative purposes, and will allow us to provide a full 
picture in our simple accounting exercise. If we compare the values of such countries with the 
median wages shown in the next column of both tables, we can see that in most cases they are 
higher than in countries with statutory systems, even if they do not apply to the full labour force.
35
 
 
 
Table 2: Basic figures on minimum wages in 2009, EU-SILC 
 
                                                     
33
 We are very grateful to Garnero, Kampelmann and Rycx for having kindly provided us with such 
estimations, so that we could use it in this report. 
34
 An alternative possibility would have been to use the lowest sector-level minimum in these countries. 
The sector-level average tends to overstate its value relative to universal systems, whereas the lowest 
minimum tends to understate it. We prefer to stick to the average, the measure preferred by Garnero, 
Kampelmann and Rycx. 
35
 According to Garnero, Kampelmann and Rycx 2013, the coverage of collective bargaining in those 
countries is: 76% in Austria, 56% in Germany, 52% in Denmark, 79% in Finland and 82% in Italy. They 
provide no estimation for Sweden. 
(1)
Monthly minimum 
wages, 2009
(2) 
Median monthly wage 
2009, EU-SILC
(3) 
EU minimum wage 
threshold (60% median)
(4)
Share of workers below 
the EUMW
(5)
Share of workers below 
the existing national MW
(6)
Relative difference 
between existing MW 
and EUMW
[(2-1)/1]
AT 1388.3 2414.0 1448.4 14.6% 7.3% 4.3%
BE 1387.5 2771.2 1662.7 9.6% 3.0% 19.8%
BG 122.7 281.2 168.7 12.2% 1.0% 37.5%
CY 822.1 1587.8 952.7 15.7% 6.3% 15.9%
CZ 297.7 746.5 447.9 10.9% 0.4% 50.5%
DE 1379.1 2500.0 1500.0 24.5% 16.7% 8.8%
DK 2341.0 3741.7 2245.0 10.0% 6.6% -4.1%
EE 278.0 632.3 379.4 18.9% 0.9% 36.5%
ES 728.0 1625.9 975.6 13.0% 2.7% 34.0%
FI 1584.3 2665.4 1599.3 6.8% 1.7% 0.9%
FR 1321.0 2036.7 1222.0 12.0% 8.1% -7.5%
GR 817.8 1515.5 909.3 11.4% 3.2% 11.2%
HU 268.1 458.0 274.8 12.1% 2.1% 2.5%
IE 1461.9 2858.4 1715.1 19.7% 6.8% 17.3%
IT 1788.0 1951.8 1171.1 13.8% 18.9% -34.5%
LT 231.7 441.8 265.1 24.2% 9.6% 14.4%
LU 1641.7 3678.4 2207.0 23.5% 3.2% 34.4%
LV 254.1 543.6 326.1 22.0% 3.6% 28.3%
MT 634.9 1315.7 789.4 12.7% 2.3% 24.3%
NL 1381.2 3198.9 1919.4 13.5% 2.8% 39.0%
PL 307.2 537.8 322.7 16.4% 4.8% 5.0%
PT 525.0 912.3 547.4 7.8% 1.9% 4.3%
RO 149.2 272.5 163.5 10.4% 1.1% 9.6%
SI 589.2 1302.1 781.2 13.2% 2.2% 32.6%
SK 295.5 600.0 360.0 8.4% 1.0% 21.8%
UK 995.3 2098.3 1259.0 18.9% 5.7% 26.5%
Source for (1): GKR estimate for countries with non-statutory minimum wage (AT, CY, DE, DK, FI, IT), Eurostat for the rest. DE figure is for 2007, adjusted for 
inflation; CY figure is an average 2008-2009. All other figures from EU-SILC 2010, cross-sectional.
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Table 3: Basic figures on minimum wages in 2010, SES 
 
The third column of both tables shows the value that would have corresponded in 2009 and 2010 
to the hypothetical common EUMW threshold of 60% of the median. Comparing this value with 
the one in the first column we can get an idea of how much impact would such coordination have 
in practice. Figure 1 shows such comparison graphically, with the hypothetical EU level in the 
horizontal axis and the existing level in the vertical axis, and a diagonal line where both values 
are the same. The distance to such diagonal line reflects the amount of change that would be 
required by a hypothetical coordination of minimum wages, and the position with respect to the 
diagonal whether the change would be positive or negative.  
 
To remind the reader of the difference between the countries with and without statutory minimum 
wages at present, the latter are indicated with a different marker (a star). These figures clearly 
show that the introduction of a common target of 60% of the median would entail an increase in 
the existing levels for many European countries, quite significant in a few cases (such as 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain, the UK and Ireland, and most Eastern member states). There 
are some exceptions, though: the clearest one is Italy, where the average collectively agreed 
minimum wage level estimated by Kampelmann, Garnero and Rycx is so high that a common EU 
threshold of 60% of the median would be considerably smaller. We must remember, though, that 
such minimum wage is just an average and that it does not cover the whole Italian labour force: 
so that the coordination of minimum wage policy would also lead to a significant increase of 
wages in the bottom in Italy, as we will see later. The other two countries that are above the 
diagonal (France and Denmark) are so close that we can only say that the establishment of a 
common EU threshold of 60% of the median would have very little or no impact on levels in 
those countries, as would be also the case in other countries such as Finland, Austria, Germany 
(where again, the main impact would be in terms of coverage), Portugal, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and Greece. 
 
(1)
Monthly minimum 
wages, 2010
(2) 
Median monthly wage 
2010, EU-SES
(3) 
EU minimum wage 
threshold (60% median)
(4) 
Share of workers below 
the EUMW
(5)
Relative difference 
between existing MW 
and EUMW
[(2-1)/1]
CY 822.1 1774.9 1064.9 16.7% 29.5%
CZ 302.2 860.5 516.3 12.6% 70.8%
EE 278.0 734.7 440.8 18.4% 58.6%
ES 738.9 1869.7 1121.8 9.0% 51.8%
FI 1584.3 2848.2 1708.9 3.1% 7.9%
FR 1343.8 2520.0 1512.0 3.4% 12.5%
HU 271.8 624.7 374.8 14.5% 37.9%
IE 1461.9 3120.0 1872.0 15.7% 28.1%
IT 1788.0 2262.9 1357.7 7.0% -24.1%
LT 231.7 468.0 280.8 21.4% 21.2%
LU 1682.8 3282.9 1969.8 9.4% 17.1%
LV 253.8 511.8 307.1 20.8% 21.0%
NL 1407.6 2921.3 1752.8 13.7% 24.5%
PL 320.9 758.3 455.0 17.8% 41.8%
PT 554.2 1029.5 617.7 7.6% 11.5%
RO 141.6 358.6 215.1 20.8% 51.9%
SI 597.4 1446.2 867.7 9.1% 45.2%
SK 307.7 705.5 423.3 13.2% 37.6%
Source for (1): GKR estimate for countries with non-statutory minimum wage (CY, FI, IT), unadjusted 2009 values, Eurostat for the 
rest (2010). CY figure is an average 2008-2009. All other figures from SES 2010.
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Figure 1: Existing minimum wage vs. hypothetical EUMW, 2009 (SILC data) 
 
The key variable throughout this report will be the share of workers below the hypothetical 
common EU minimum wage level in the different countries (as well as sectors, etc). A 
preliminary approximation to this variable is shown in column 4 of tables 2 and 3: it can be easily 
seen that in nearly all countries, there would be a significant amount of workers below such 
threshold, whose wage would therefore increase if such a policy would be implemented. 
According to the EU-SILC, in most countries the share of workers below the threshold is between 
10 and 15%, with several countries around or above 20% (the Baltics, UK and Ireland, and 
Germany). We will discuss these figures in detail in the next section: for the moment, we want to 
put them in the context of the share of workers below existing minimum wage levels, which 
illustrates the point made before about the difference between countries with and without 
statutory minimum wages. Column 5 of table 2 (only available for EU-SILC data) shows the 
share of workers below existing minimum wage levels in 2009 (using as threshold 75% of the 
value shown in column 1, following Kampelmann, Garnero and Rycx 2013)
36
: as we can see, in 
nearly all countries the  share of workers below the existing minimum wage level is below 5%, 
                                                     
36
The existence of a statutory minimum wage tends to create a spike in the distribution of wages around 
such minimum wage level, to the extent that at least some of the jobs that would otherwise have lower pay 
tend to accumulate at the minimum level. Since the measure of wages in surveys is not totally precise, 
using the exact value of the minimum wage as the threshold for identifying who earns less than that is 
likely to misclassify a large number of workers who are precisely around the threshold. For that reason, it 
makes sense to specify a slightly lower figure, such as 75% of the official value, which is safely below the 
spike and therefore minimizes the number of wrong identifications, as done by Garnero, Kampelmann and 
Rycx 2013. The same logic does not apply to the hypothetical EU minimum wage level of 60% of the 
median, because such value has no applicability nowadays and therefore there is no spike around it. Of 
course, there will be some misidentified cases, but they are likely to even out because they will be both 
above and below the threshold. In the next section, we will see some graphic evidence of this spike and its 
relationship with existing minimum wage levels. 
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which suggests both a high level of compliance and that they are so low that they have very little 
effective impact. As for the countries where there is more than 5% of workers below the existing 
minimum wages, most of them have non-statutory or non-national minimum wages (Italy, 
Germany, Denmark, Austria and Cyprus), which means that the issue at stake is not compliance 
but coverage, and the existence of specific minimum wages which can be significantly below the 
overall national average. Only in France, Lithuania, the UK and Ireland there is both a statutory 
national minimum wage and a significantly high share of workers below such threshold, which 
may result from non-compliance or the existence of sub-minima for specific groups (such as 
younger workers).
37
 
 
5. b. How many workers would be affected? 
 
The most obvious indicator of the scale of the impact of a hypothetical common wage floor is the 
percentage of workers below such threshold. As we explained in the methodological section, the 
lack of a dataset measuring wages for the full labour force in the different countries forces us to 
compare the results using two different datasets (EU-SILC and SES), which complicates the 
picture but allows us to make a more correct evaluation of the potential impact of such a 
hypothetical minimum wage coordination. Figure 3 below shows the proportion of workers below 
60% of the median wage in each country according to the two sources, including different 
specifications of the Structure of Earnings Surveys. We will discuss this complicated figure in 
some detail, to be able to provide later a simple but faithful classification of countries. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the source that provides a better measure of wages and a larger sample size 
is the Structure of Earnings Survey. The problem with this source is that it does not cover the 
whole economy (leaving out small firms and public administration, most importantly), and also 
that we could not get access to data for all countries. In figure 2, the countries have been sorted 
according to the base figure of SES (ie, excluding establishments with less than 10 employees and 
public administration), identified by a black square marker; the countries for which we do not 
have SES data are shown separately at the right-hand side of the chart, sorted by the share of 
workers below the EUMW threshold according to EU-SILC. The EU-SILC figure is indicated by 
a diamond in the chart. The next two markers correspond to different specifications of the SES 
dataset, which are available only in some countries but are informative. The star shows the share 
of workers below the EUMW threshold according to the SES for establishments of all sizes (for 
the countries that provide such data); the line marker identifies the share of EUMW workers 
according to SES including public administration (again, where such data is available). Finally, 
the circle symbol is used only for the countries for which we did not have access to SES data, but 
for which Eurostat itself has published a figure which is similar to ours: the percentage of workers 
below 2/3 of the median in each country (for establishments with more than 10 employees, 
excluding public administration). We include such data to be able to evaluate roughly the 
consistency between our two sources for those countries as well. 
 
                                                     
37
 As well as some of the measurement problems mentioned earlier in section 4. 
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Figure 2: Share of workers below the hypothetical EUMW threshold, different sources and 
specifications 
 
In general terms, the consistency between the different specifications of the SES data is higher 
than the consistency between SES and SILC. What this suggests is that the differences between 
both sources are not so much the result of their differences in coverage (SILC covering the whole 
economy and SES generally not) but the result of differences in the measurement and 
specification of wages. That said, the inconsistency between SES and SILC in the country 
comparison seems to be concentrated in a few countries, which are highlighted in the figure (by a 
circle around the country label). In the majority of countries, the inconsistency is much smaller 
and seems reasonably within the boundaries of what we would expect according to the different 
specification of variables. This will be useful for the classification of countries in terms of the 
scale of the impact of a hypothetical EUMW policy, because in most cases the use of one or the 
other source would not make much difference. 
 
In a few countries, nevertheless, the inconsistency is quite important, so it justifies a more 
detailed discussion: 
 
- Romania: in this case, the share of workers below the EUMW threshold is significantly lower 
(around half) according to EU-SILC than according to SES. The SES does not cover small 
establishments in this country, but EU-SILC does, so we can check whether the exclusion of 
small firms may biases the SES results. Romania is one of the countries were (according to EU-
SILC) low pay is less concentrated in small firms: 24% of low-paid jobs are in small firms, 
compared to 15% of the rest of jobs (in most other countries, the difference is bigger).The 
difference in the median wage of small establishments and the rest is not very big either. So the 
problem is probably not that the SES results are biased by the exclusion of small firms, but the 
different specification of the variable of wages, which is not very good at SILC. Although we do 
not have SES data for Bulgaria, it seems that this country would have a similar problem. 
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- Luxembourg: in this case, the inconsistency goes the other way. According to SILC, the share of 
low-paid workers is nearly two and a half times larger than according to SES. Contrary to 
Romania, in Luxembourg there seems to be quite a strong bias in the share of low pay in small 
and large establishments: nearly 40% of workers in small establishments in Luxembourg are low 
paid according to SILC, compared to less than 20% in the rest. The median wage is also much 
smaller (one third difference). So in this case, the SES result may be biased downwards by its 
exclusion of small establishments, even if the SILC estimate may seem excessively high. 
 
- France and Italy: similar to Luxembourg, there is a significantly higher share of low pay in 
small establishments in these companies, so the inconsistency between our two sources may point 
to an excessively low estimate with the SES data. The bias in the actual median values is less 
important, though. 
 
- Sweden: in this case, the SES figure is extremely low, almost negligible (less than 1%), whereas 
the SILC figure would put this country around the middle of the chart. In this case, both SES and 
SILC seem to provide biased results, in opposite directions. In the case of SILC, the Swedish data 
does not collect gross earnings as in most countries, but net and subsequently imputed: the 
imputation process seems to have generated an implausibly high proportion of low-paid 
workers.
38
 But the SES base estimation also seems problematic, in this case because the figures 
for working hours seem implausibly low for many low-paid workers (our base wage measure is 
calculated as an hourly rate, and therefore would tend to inflate the estimation if hours are too 
low). We can see such problem by comparing the base SES estimation (the black square marker) 
with the SES estimation based on annual wages, which is normalized in terms of full-time 
equivalents rather than working hours. These two magnitudes are very similar in most cases 
(normalizing by hours or full-time equivalents does not make a big difference), except in the case 
of Sweden, where one produces less than 1% of low-paid workers and the other more than 5%. 
 
 
Figure 3: Share of workers below the hypothetical EUMW threshold, final assessment. 
Source: 2010 EU-SILC, except * (average between EU-SILC 2010 and SES 2010 figures, because of inconsistency 
between the two sources) 
 
                                                     
38
 SILC provides extremely limited documentation of these issues. According to the SILC dataset, all the 
results for Sweden were only collected net, which would mean that the variable of gross labour earnings 
that we are using here has been imputed: but in fact, the associated imputation factor has a value of 0 for 
Sweden, which would mean that there was no imputation at all. Does it mean that the Swedish figures for 
labour earnings in SILC are only provided net? We could find no mention of this in the SILC quality report 
or anywhere else. France is the only other country with a similar problem in SILC, although the bias seems 
not so large in that case. 
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Taken into account these problems, figure 3 provides a final assessment of the share of workers 
below the threshold of 60% of median national wages, which shall serve us later for classifying 
countries. The basis for the numbers behind this figure is EU-SILC for most countries, with the 
exception of the already discussed problematic countries, for which we use the average between 
the EU-SILC and the baseline SES result. 
 
Box 3: An alternative threshold based on 50% of average wages in each country 
 
As mentioned earlier, using the median or the average as reference for the EUMW threshold can lead to 
important differences. The median is insensitive to the extent of inequality in the upper tail of the 
distribution (in fact, in the bottom as well, since the median simply refers to the wage that occupies the 
exact middle of the distribution, separating the 50% of the workforce earning more from the 50% earning 
less), while the average is very sensitive to it. Since wages tend to have a very skewed distribution, with 
many workers earning relatively low wages and a few earning very high ones, the average is higher than 
the median wage in all EU-27 countries according to EU-SILC, ranging from around 25% higher or more 
(Portugal, Lithuania, Latvia, UK, Estonia) to less than 10% higher (Germany and Denmark).  
 
 
Figure X. Proportion of employees under the average-based EUMW threshold 
 
Since countries are characterized by different wage distributions, they can be ranked differently depending 
on what measure is used. Using as reference for the EUMW threshold the average rather than the mean, 
therefore, can lead to some differences in the impact across different countries. To test this, we have 
recalculated our basic measure using 50% of the average rather than 60% of the median (following some 
existing proposals: see section 2 of this report). Figure X shows the proportion of the workforce that would 
be affected in each of the EU-27 countries according to the two different methods of calculating the 
EUMW threshold. In most countries, the difference is very small, but there are a few where it is quite 
significant: the most extreme case is Portugal, where the share of workers below 50% of the average is 
more than twice the share of workers below 60% of the median. The share of workers below the average-
based threshold is also significantly higher in the UK, Latvia and Lithuania. These are countries 
characterized by a high degree of wage inequality and therefore by an average much larger than the 
median. 
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Box 4: A sector-specific minimum wage threshold 
The baseline scenario for our accounting exercise assumes a single wage floor for each country, relative to 
the median for the whole economy. Alternatively, the threshold could be referenced to the median wage in 
each sector. Although we are not aware of such a proposal in the debate, this alternative could in principle 
have some advantages: the effect on the wage distribution could be more similar to that of the collectively 
agreed system (which is sector-specific as well), and it could pose fewer problems for competitiveness and 
profitability, theoretically being more in line with sector wage differentials and therefore with productivity. 
The following chart shows the share of workers affected by a national minimum wage (set at 60% of the 
median wage in each country, our baseline scenario in this report) and by a sector-specific minimum 
wage
39
 (set at 60% of the median wage in each sector and country). As we can see, the difference in the 
overall share of workers affected would be very marginal. 
 
Figure x: National vs. sector-specific minimum wage, share of workers affected (SES 2010 data) 
But even though the number of workers affected would be very similar in both systems, the distributional 
implications are strikingly different, as we can see in the following table comparing the share of workers 
affected in each sector and country in the two systems. This effect was to be expected, but perhaps not to 
such extent. In all countries, the share of workers affected in the low-paid sectors would be drastically 
reduced , whereas the share of workers affected in the high-paying sectors would increase very 
significantly. For instance, if we look at the lowest paid sector in Europe, Less Knowledge Intensive 
(private) Services, we can see that the share of workers affected would go from 13.4 to 6.7% on average 
(from 13 to 3.5 in Spain, from 28 to 9.9 in Ireland, from 25 to 13.5 in Netherlands). Conversely, in the 
highest paid sector (Knowledge Intensive Private Services) the share of workers affected would go from 8 
to 17.7% on average (from 6.7 to 19.3 in Spain, from 5.3 to 15.7 in Italy, from 3.9 to 27.3 in Portugal).  
Whereas a national minimum wage reduces significantly wage inequalities across sectors (by raising the 
wages of the low-paid sectors in particular), a sector-specific minimum wage can in fact accentuate them. 
The strongest effect would not be on the lowest paid workers of the economy, but on the lowest paid 
workers of the highest paid sectors (which may not be so low paid in general terms). To the extent that 
wage inequalities are linked to sector differentials, it could end up increasing overall inequality. Such a 
minimum wage scheme may be more consistent with productivity levels, but it seems difficult to justify in 
terms of its equity implications. 
                                                     
39
 All the analysis in this box is based on SES data. EU-SILC does not have the required level of detail in 
the sector classification. For the sector-specific minimum wage threshold, we have used 9 broad sectors of 
the economy: primary, Low Technology Industries (LTI), High Technology Industries (HTI), Less 
Knowledge Intensive Services (LKIS), Knowledge Intensive Services (KIS), Education and Health (public 
administration is not included in SES). 
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Table x: National vs. sector-specific minimum wage, share of workers affected by country and (SES 2010 data) 
 
 
5. c. The distribution of wages below the threshold 
 
So far, we have focused on the most simple and obvious measure of the potential quantitative 
impact of the establishment of a common EUMW threshold of 60% of the median: the percentage 
of workers below such threshold. Although such an approach is useful, it has the problem of not 
taking into account the intensity of the effect on each individual case. Not all workers below the 
threshold earn the same wage: the distance between the current wage and the hypothetical 
minimum wage can vary considerably and consequently the actual impact for different affected 
workers. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates this point. It shows the cumulative distribution of relative wages below the 
median in each country: the horizontal axis shows the wage expressed as a percentage of each 
  
Constr. LTI HTI LKIS KIS Educ. Health 
CY National 5.40 26.09 10.93 26.83 5.98 1.69 11.82 
  Sector-specific 13.59 15.86 8.21 6.45 20.83 17.66 13.50 
CZ National 8.28 12.09 6.65 18.71 14.72 4.82 8.43 
  Sector-specific 8.77 8.46 7.48 14.00 23.29 11.80 7.50 
EE National 12.67 15.99 10.85 24.12 11.81 20.35 20.15 
  Sector-specific 17.52 13.39 12.41 13.60 19.96 22.66 16.83 
ES National 2.26 5.60 1.22 13.17 6.73 5.41 8.89 
  Sector-specific 1.71 6.71 8.06 3.50 19.28 20.50 15.11 
FI National 0.68 0.64 0.32 5.39 1.37 2.05 2.90 
  Sector-specific 1.90 1.54 3.61 1.51 6.45 6.68 1.34 
FR National 7.77 2.44 2.12 2.93 1.71 0.13 5.72 
  Sector-specific 6.84 2.70 7.94 1.78 12.09 4.32 4.14 
HU National 22.36 18.34 10.15 18.36 10.19 3.13 8.78 
  Sector-specific 8.45 10.42 11.79 9.34 24.95 14.42 3.68 
IE National 19.95 14.45 8.65 28.26 9.38 4.51 9.99 
  Sector-specific 16.02 11.53 13.34 9.94 16.60 22.85 11.84 
IT National 7.68 7.46 3.35 11.13 5.25 0.58 5.31 
  Sector-specific 7.34 4.55 4.09 4.35 15.70 21.19 10.26 
LT National 25.37 21.43 6.97 26.30 13.10 24.46 12.63 
  Sector-specific 23.43 20.62 15.48 0.00 22.34 34.25 15.25 
LU National 6.03 5.22 10.19 20.92 3.86 0.55 8.67 
  Sector-specific 1.38 6.16 0.83 1.23 17.71 26.32 17.60 
LV National 27.28 26.66 9.64 23.95 12.67 18.59 13.87 
  Sector-specific 17.95 14.45 16.62 18.08 27.17 20.07 9.79 
NL National 4.96 8.15 3.61 25.00 14.72 2.70 6.17 
  Sector-specific 6.64 7.17 7.16 13.50 17.53 7.57 7.69 
PL National 26.14 22.02 8.67 23.58 18.44 5.29 7.68 
  Sector-specific 21.15 15.06 9.98 14.62 25.18 29.81 6.89 
PT National 5.83 12.57 2.30 8.62 3.91 0.78 6.49 
  Sector-specific 0.59 0.03 6.63 1.06 27.29 24.62 6.31 
RO National 26.73 22.71 3.58 27.02 21.82 12.82 14.95 
  Sector-specific 19.27 15.20 9.59 19.60 32.29 20.10 13.22 
SE National 3.10 2.79 0.82 7.39 6.31 5.30 5.14 
  Sector-specific 4.87 3.54 2.27 6.06 11.09 3.65 3.26 
SI National 15.69 10.30 4.78 9.68 5.97 1.36 6.63 
  Sector-specific 3.18 2.69 2.87 2.58 17.81 21.70 9.43 
SK National 13.56 11.86 9.73 16.89 14.07 8.66 10.18 
  Sector-specific 13.34 11.85 9.07 8.58 21.76 15.32 8.99 
Total National 10.59 11.21 4.18 13.42 8.12 4.31 6.81 
  Sector-specific 8.70 7.89 7.23 6.67 17.67 17.15 7.46 
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country’s median, and the vertical axis the cumulative share of employment associated to such 
wage levels. For facilitating the interpretation of the country charts, we have drawn a series of 
grey vertical lines at the levels of 40%, 55%, 60% (the threshold that we are studying in this 
paper) and 65% of the national median; also, we have included a black vertical line at the level of 
the existing minimum wage (actual or estimated by Kampelmann, Garnero and Rycx 2013). So 
for instance, in Germany (DE), the average collectively agreed minimum wage currently stands at 
around 55% of the median, and there are more than 20% of workers whose current wages are 
below that level; below 40% of the median, there are around 15% of workers, and below 60% of 
the median (the hypothetical EUMW level) there are nearly 25% of workers. The countries have 
been arranged in the chart according to the three main categories of minimum wage systems that 
we identified in the previous section: the countries at the left-hand side of the chart are those with 
collectively agreed and sector-specific minimum wages; those in the middle (separated by lines) 
have collectively agreed but national minimum wages; and those at the right (the majority) have 
statutory national minimum wages. 
 
The area behind each curve in figure 4 is proportional to the impact of establishing a common 
statutory minimum wage threshold of 60% of the median in each country. Not only we see how 
many workers are below the threshold (where the next-to-last vertical grey line crosses the 
curve), but also by how much would the wages actually increase. The more to the left the curve is 
located, the largest would be the increase in pay; the highest, the more workers would be affected. 
 
This figure also shows how the different minimum wage setting mechanisms produce different 
distributions of wages below the median. The countries with national statutory minimum wages 
tend to have a bumpier distribution of wages below the median, with few workers below the 
minimum wage threshold and an abrupt increase after; countries with collectively agreed sector-
specific minimum wages, on the other hand, show a much smoother and continuous distribution 
of wages below the median, and the estimated average agreed minimum wage is not associated 
with any discontinuity in the cumulative distribution of wages. Nevertheless, according to our 
analysis there are exceptions to this general pattern in both groups of countries: Finland and 
Sweden show a relatively abrupt distribution of wages (with the curve turning upwards at around 
50 and 55% of the median, respectively: coinciding with the effective average agreed minimum 
wage estimated by GKR in the case of Finland); on the other hand, Greece, Belgium, the UK and 
Ireland show a rather continuous distribution, in which the minimum wage line does not seem 
associated with any bump in the cumulative distribution, with workers more or less equally 
distributed below and above the line (quite similar, in fact, to the countries without statutory 
minimum wages). To some extent, this may be the result of data problems, since for three of 
those four countries (the exception is Ireland) we only have data from SILC, which as we have 
repeatedly said has some problems in measuring wages. In fact, the countries for which we have 
SES data tend to show more clearly the effect of existing minimum wages than the countries for 
which we only have SILC. It may also result from the existence of subminima and exceptions 
(which were not taken into account for computing these charts). 
 
The most important point, though, is that in some countries the area behind the curve is relatively 
small even if the share of workers below the minimum wage line is relatively large. This is the 
case of Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, Spain and Slovenia. This may be an effect of existing 
minimum wages (in Lithuania, Latvia and Luxembourg, where there is nobody below the existing 
minimum wage line and this reduces considerably the area behind the curve) or other factors (in 
Spain or Slovenia, where the existing minimum wage is considerably below the turning point of 
the curve). Where the area behind the curve is larger is in Germany, Estonia, the UK and Ireland, 
Cyprus, Austria and Romania. 
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Figure 4: Cumulative distribution of wages below the threshold (SES indicated in capital letters, 
SILC in small caps; * indicates estimated agreed average minimum wage from GKR) 
 
We can now calculate an alternative index of the potential impact of establishing a minimum 
wage threshold of 60% of the median with a similar approximation to the one underlying figure 4. 
We can calculate, for each individual worker below the threshold, the relative distance between 
the wage that corresponds to 60% of the median and the current wage. Figure 5 plots the median 
of such new indicator (distance of current wage to the hypothetical EUMW) in each country (in 
the vertical axis), together with the previously used indicator of share of workers below the 
hypothetical EUMW (in the horizontal axis). The distance to the origin in such figure is 
proportional to the impact that the establishment of a common EU threshold of 60% of the 
median would have. As could be expected, the biggest impact is in Germany, which really stands 
out from the rest of Europe in terms of the distribution of earnings below the median. Other 
countries where the impact would be high according to this new measure are the UK, Austria, 
Cyprus, Netherlands and Ireland, as well as the Baltic states, Romania, Poland, and Denmark. 
 
 34 
 
 
Figure 5: Workers affected by a hypothetical EUMW and median distance between existing wage 
and the hypothetical EUMW threshold 
 
 
5.d. Summarizing the potential impact of an EU minimum wage policy across 
countries 
 
So we can now summarize our overall assessment of the quantitative impact that a hypothetical 
coordination of minimum wages around 60% of each national median would have, adding also 
the assessment of the institutional impact that we discussed at the end of the previous section. 
Such summary is provided in table 4 below. 
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Table 4: An assessment of the potential impact of a hypothetical common EUMW threshold across EU 
countries 
at
be
bg
cy
cz
de
dk
ee
es
fi
fr
gr
hu
ie
it
lt
lu
lv
mt
nl
pl
pt
ro
se
si
sk
uk
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
A
ve
ra
ge
 d
is
ta
n
ce
 b
et
w
e
e
n
 E
U
M
W
  a
n
d
 c
u
rr
e
n
t 
w
ag
e
 (
o
n
ly
 f
o
r 
th
o
se
 b
e
lo
w
 t
h
e
 t
h
re
so
ld
)
Share of workers below the EUMW threshold
(Bigger impact)
 35 
 
 
The country where the impact would be higher, and hence the difficulty of establishing such 
system, would be Germany. On the one hand, the share of workers currently below 60% of the 
median is one of the highest in Europe, according to the EU-SILC (we could not get access to the 
SES data for Germany, but the data published by Eurostat shows that this country is also one of 
the highest in terms of percentage of low-wage earners).
40
 On the other hand, currently the 
minimum wages in Germany are collectively agreed and sector-specific, so moving into some 
form of statutory national system would involve a large-scale institutional transformation. In fact, 
Germany is discussing the possible implementation of a national statutory minimum wage at 
present: although there is still some uncertainty about the final outcome, the upper chamber of 
Germany has recently proposed the introduction of a statutory national minimum wage of 8.5 
euros per hour.
41
 Such development would obviously reduce the institutional difficulty of EU 
minimum wage coordination in Germany.
42
 
 
The other countries with collectively agreed sector-specific minimum wages have all been located 
in the same column as Germany, but the quantitative incidence of a threshold at 60% of the 
median would be considerably smaller because of the lower incidence of low pay. This is 
particularly the case in the Nordic countries, where the share of workers below 60% of the 
median is well below EU average, despite lacking a statutory national threshold. This is one of 
the reasons why in practice, Nordic countries are likely to be the most resistant to the introduction 
of such a common EU threshold: contrary to Germany (where this system has not prevented the 
expansion of a large low-paid segment), the sector-specific-bargaining model seems to be 
producing good economic and social outcomes in these countries, and it is widely supported by 
social partners and governments. 
 
In the second column we have put the countries where minimum wage levels are currently set by 
social partners but at a national level: the establishment of a common threshold of 60% of the 
median would simply change the level, not the structure and coverage, of minimum wages. Still, 
it could imply a significant change in the type of involvement of social partners on the setting of 
the threshold, which involves at least a medium level of institutional impact. In Estonia, Poland 
and Cyprus, between 15 and 20% of workers would be affected by such change, which is quite a 
significant amount; in Bulgaria and Greece, the quantitative impact would be medium; and in 
Belgium and Slovakia it would be low because of the limited current incidence of low pay. 
 
Finally, the third column includes all countries where minimum wages are statutory and national, 
and therefore the impact would be mostly on the levels. In Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, the UK 
and Ireland there is a significant share of the labour force under the hypothetical threshold, and 
therefore the quantitative impact would be largest. Slightly less but still important would be the 
impact on Hungary, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Spain and Malta. Both 
types of impact would be low in Portugal and France: these would be the countries where the 
establishment of a common EU threshold of 60% of the median would be easier, because such 
arrangement would imply little change with respect to the current situation. 
 
                                                     
40
 Other recent studies using other German data sources provide results which are consistent with our 
estimations. See for instance Bosch and Weinkopf 2011; Heumer, Lesch and Schroeder 2013.  
41
 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2013/03/articles/de1303019i.htm 
42
 8.5 euros per hour is very close to the hypothetical EU minimum wage level that we estimated using EU-
SILC for Germany. 
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Two final comments on table 4. First, it is interesting to note that the institutional and quantitative 
impact seem to go in opposite directions: most of the countries where the quantitative impact 
would be high (ie, many workers would be affected) are in the column of low institutional impact, 
and vice versa. This is because (perhaps paradoxically) countries with statutory national 
minimum wages generally have a larger low-pay segment of employment and therefore would be 
more affected by a common higher threshold, whereas the opposite happens in countries with 
collectively agreed sectorial minimum wages. There are, of course, important exceptions to this: 
Germany has collectively agreed minimum wages and a very high share of low pay, whereas the 
opposite happens in France. A second thing to note is that European regions are associated with 
specific positions in table 4: in particular, Nordic countries are associated with the low 
quantitative and high institutional impact category; the UK and Ireland, as well as the Baltics, 
with the high quantitative and low institutional impact; and most other Eastern and Southern 
member states with medium quantitative and/or institutional impact. The only group of countries 
that has no clear position in table 4 is Continental European countries, which are scattered 
throughout all categories (in particular, Germany and France are polar opposites). Of course, this 
association was to be expected, since these European regions are associated with similar 
institutional structures, and such structures affect both the minimum wage systems and incidence 
of low pay; but such association is important for the debate about the possibility of establishing a 
common minimum wage policy in Europe, because it highlights that it would imply some degree 
of institutional convergence closer to some particular socio-economic models (the one on the low 
right quadrant of the table). 
 
 
6. Workers most affected by the introduction of an EU minimum wage 
 
So far the empirical analysis has focused on estimating the share of the working population that 
would be directly affected by a hypothetical European minimum wage set at 60% of the median 
in each Member State. The focus will shift now to describing the composition of such population, 
using a range of company, job-related and personal characteristics.  
 
For reasons of simplicity, the results in this section will mostly come from the EU-SILC dataset, 
while the Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) data will be used as a complementary source only 
when relevant. Table 5 presents a broad description of the characteristics of the affected 
population based on EU-SILC data, while results using SES data are presented in the Annex. 
 
For each variable, two types of measures are provided for the European aggregate
43
: a) the 
proportion of employees that falls below the EUMW threshold of 60% of the median in each 
category; and b) the share that such category represents over the total working population under 
the EUMW in Europe. For instance, the proportion of employees affected in the primary sector is 
among the highest (32,6%), since almost one out of three agriculture employees are receiving 
salaries which are below 60% of the median wage in their respective countries. Nevertheless, as a 
share of the total working population potentially affected by the hypothetical EUMW, the primary 
                                                     
43
 EU-SILC data includes all EU-27 countries and companies of all sizes. For the SES data presented in the 
Annex, one European aggregate is presented for the sample including 19 countries for which no data on the 
smallest companies (less than 10 employees) is available and another one for the sample including 12 
countries for which data on all company sizes is available.   
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sector only represents around 3%, since this sector represents a small share of overall 
employment in Europe. 
 
 
Table 5. Characteristics of the working population affected by the EUMW (based on the EU-SILC dataset).  
a. It refers to the ratio between the number of low-paid employees (earning wages below 60% of the mendian wage in 
their country) and the total number of employees in a certain category.  
b. It refers to the share represented by the low-paid employees  in a certain category over the total number of low-paid 
employees in Europe. 
 
Most of this section will focus on the incidence of the hypothetical EUMW threshold of 60% of 
the median in different groups of the working population, but it is useful to look at the broad 
characteristics of the segment of affected employees, shown in rows (b) of table 5 and briefly 
explained in Box 5.  
 
Box 5. A profile of the European workforce potentially affected by a hypothetical EUMW policy 
 
Most of the workers below the EUMW threshold work in small companies (nearly 40% in companies with 
less than 10 employees, 70% in companies with less than 50), mostly in personal service sectors (nearly 
20% in retail, 13% in health, nearly 10% in other services and 8% in horeca). Almost half of them would 
work in service and elementary occupations, and although the incidence of part-time and temporary 
employment is higher for this group, most of them have permanent (77%) and full-time (64%) contracts. 
Nearly two thirds of the population potentially affected by a hypothetical EUMW policy are women. And 
they would be predominantly young too: 56% of them are less than 40 years old, and 35% less than 29. 
Company characteristics
Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing (NACE A)
Manufacturing; 
mining; 
electricity, gaz 
and water 
supply (NACE B-
E)
Construction 
(NACE F)
Retail 
trade;motor 
repairs (NACE G)
Transportati
on and 
storage 
(NACE H)
Accommoda
tion and 
food service 
(NACE I)
Information 
and 
communicati
on (NACE J)
Financial 
and 
insurance 
(NACE K)
Real state; 
professional 
and 
administrativ
e activities 
(NACE L-N)
Public 
Admin. and 
defense 
(NACE O)
Incidence of low-pay(a) 32.6 11.8 13.9 22.0 10.5 33.0 9.0 6.0 19.7 7.3
Share over total low-pay(b) 3.3 15.2 6.1 18.0 3.6 7.6 1.7 1.5 9.7 4.4
Education (NACE P) Health and 
social work 
(NACE Q)
Arts, 
households, 
extra-territorial 
bodies (NACE R-
U)
Less 11 11 to 49 >50
Incidence of low-pay 12.1 18.8 33.5 26.5 16.0 10.2
Share over total low-pay 6.6 12.9 9.5 38.5 31.4 30.1
Personal characteristics
Male Female 14/29 30/39 40/49 50/59 60+ Lower Higher
Incidence of low-pay 10.8 21.5 27.7 12.7 12.1 13.2 20.9 26.5 13.3
Share over total low-pay 35.9 64.1 34.5 21.3 21.8 17.4 5.0 31.4 68.6
Job characteristics
Managers Professionals Technicians Clerical Service Skilled Craft Plant Elementary Army
Incidence of low-pay 4.7 5.2 10.3 14.5 30.6 34.1 15.0 12.0 36.2 4.4
Share over total low-pay 1.8 4.8 12.1 12.1 26.7 2.4 11.4 6.5 22.0 0.2
Permanent Temporary Full-time Part-time
Incidence of low-pay 13.7 31.3 12.2 34.8
Share over total low-pay 76.9 23.1 64.0 36.0
Occupation
Type of contract Type of employment 
Economic activity
Economic activity (continued) Company size
Sex Age Education
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6.1. Company-related variables 
Economic activity 
 
The sector dimension has a significant impact on the share of workers under the hypothetical 
EUMW threshold (see figure 6). First, the hypothetical EUMW would affect around a third of 
employees in the sectors of hotels and restaurants (HORECA); agriculture; and arts and 
entertainment (NACE R-U). The proportion of employees affected in these three sectors is above 
national averages in all countries except some few exceptions (see Annex).
44
 Nevertheless, due to 
the relatively small size of these sectors, the employees affected would represent less than 20% of 
the total employees affected by the hypothetical EUMW. 
 
 
Figure 6. Employees affected by the EUMW by sector (EU-SILC) 
 
Second, employees in the retail, real estate activities and health sectors would come next since 
around 20% of them would be affected. While the proportion of employees affected in the retail 
and real estate activities would be above national averages in most countries, the picture is more 
mixed for the health sector. Due to the large employment share of these sectors, around 40% of 
the employees whose wages would be affected by the EU-wide minimum threshold would come 
from these three sectors, especially from the retail sector.  
 
Third, in the remaining sectors, the proportion of employees affected would vary from the highest 
proportions in the construction, education and manufacturing sectors to the lowest in finance and 
                                                     
44
 In some cases, the proportion of employees potentially affected by the hypothetical EU minimum wage 
policy would be close to or above 50%: Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland, Lithuania, Sweden and the UK in 
the HORECA sector; Germany, Luxembourg and Greece in the agricultural sector; and Cyprus in arts and 
entertainment. 
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public administration. By countries, the proportion of employees affected in these sectors would 
be lower than the national average in most cases, with the exception of the construction sector, 
where the proportion of employees affected by the hypothetical European minimum wage would 
be higher than average in many countries, such as Luxembourg, Denmark or Italy. 
 
Finally, the proportion of employees affected is higher among females than males across all 
economic sectors. The largest gaps in the proportion of employees affected, considered in 
percentage points, occur in the arts and entertainment, HORECA, retail and agriculture sectors. 
The proportion of females affected doubles that of males in the financial, manufacturing, retail, 
arts and entertainment and public administration sectors.  
 
The sector data in the SES is available at the two-digit level and therefore allows for the 
construction of an alternative sectoral typology which is also informative. Low knowledge 
intensive services
45
 (LKIS), low technology industry
46
 (LTI) and construction are characterized 
by the highest proportions of employees potentially affected, with more than 10% in each of 
them. Employees in the LKIS sector really stand out, since almost half of the employees whose 
wages would be increased by an EUMW would come from this sector. The proportion of 
employees affected in the LKIS sector is above the national average in all European countries but 
France and Sweden, two countries characterized by relatively high minimum wage levels (see 
Annex).
47
  
Company size 
 
The proportion of employees potentially affected by a hypothetical EUMW would be much 
higher among small companies. Figure 7 shows that this is the case for all countries. A blue line 
has been drawn along the diagonal: the closer to this diagonal, the less difference there is between 
the share of employees affected in small and large firms. As we can immediately see, all countries 
are found well above the diagonal line, since the proportion of affected employees is considerably 
higher among those employees working in smaller firms.
48
 
 
For the EU-27 aggregate, the proportion of employees affected in companies with more than 50 
employees would be around 10%, a proportion that jumps to 25% for the smallest companies with 
10 or less employees. The difference in the proportions of employees affected by firm’s size 
would be especially significant in countries such as Cyprus, Ireland, Finland, France or Greece. 
                                                     
45
 LKIS include retail, hotels, restaurants and catering, land transport, public administration, recycling and 
private households. For more details, see Felix, 2006. 
46
 The distinction between High and Low Technology Industry is based on the intensity of research and 
development in the sector (ratio of R&D expenditure to value added) and the technology embodied in the 
purchases of intermediate and capital goods. For more details, see Hatzichronoglou, 1997. 
47
 The proportion of employees affected in the education, health or construction sectors reported in the SES 
is lower than when using EU-SILC, since the former does not include small companies. In the case of the 
primary sector, the striking difference between both sources, EU-SILC and SES, is mainly due to the fact 
that the primary sector in the SES only comprises mining and quarrying, characterized by higher levels of 
pay than agriculture. 
48
 Distinguishing by gender, the ratio in the proportion of employees affected between females and males 
would remain more or less constant across all firm sizes, with a higher proportion of females being affected 
in all cases.  
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On the contrary, the gap (measured as the ratio between the respective proportion of employees 
affected) is smallest in countries such as Sweden, Estonia or Romania. 
 
 
Figure 7. Proportion of people affected by the EUMW by firm's size (EU-SILC). 
 
Crossing company size and sector, we can see that the higher proportion of employees affected in 
small firms occurs across all economic sectors. In fact, the relationship between the size of the 
company and the share of workers below the 60% of the median threshold is so strong that it is 
likely to explain partly the previously shown differences by sector: it is in the sectors where more 
employees work in smaller companies (arts and entertainment, agriculture and horeca) where the 
effect of the hypothetical EUMW would be larger, and vice versa (see figure 8).
49
  
                                                     
49
 This significant correlation between the proportion of affected employees and the share represented by 
the smaller companies in each sector also exists in most Member States. The correlation is of around 0.5-
0.7 depending on the country, and only for some of them (BG, DK, EE, HU, LT, SK, UK) it is around 0.3. 
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Figure 8. Share of employees working in small companies by sectors 
 
Collective bargaining 
 
The high relevance of firm’s size to explain the proportion of employees affected is further 
confirmed by looking at SES data.
50
 Additionally, the SES data permits to evaluate the impact of 
collective bargaining. As shown by figure 9, at the aggregate (country) level, the share of workers 
potentially affected by the hypothetical EUMW is smaller in countries where a higher share of the 
workforce is covered by collective pay agreements, and vice versa. The same relationship can 
also be observed at the company level, since companies not covered by collective pay agreements 
would be much more affected by the hypothetical common EUMW.
51
 As we saw in the literature 
review, minimum wage policy can often be understood as a functional equivalent for collective 
bargaining for companies and sectors with limited coverage: indeed, the hypothetical EUMW 
policy we are evaluating here would affect more this type of companies. 
 
                                                     
50
 As already explained, we have worked with two different SES samples, one covering companies with 10 
or more employees for a wide sub-set of countries (19) and one including as well the smallest companies 
but only for 12 countries. In both cases, the relationship between firm size and effect of the hypothetical 
EUMW is very strong (see Annex). 
51
 Collective bargaining coverage is positively correlated with firm’s size. The proportion of employees not 
covered by collective pay agreements (at any level) is: 22% in companies with 10-49 employees; 19% in 
companies with 50-249 employees; 14% in companies with 250-499 employees; 11.5% in companies with 
500-999 employees; and only 7.3% in companies with more than a thousand employees. 
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Figure 9. Collective pay agreement coverage and incidence of low-pay in the country. 
Note: Sweden, Netherlands and Ireland have been excluded due to problems in the coding of the variable on collective 
pay agreement coverage in SES. 
 
Therefore, company size, sector and collective bargaining coverage are three interrelated factors 
that have a consistent and combined impact on the share of workers below the hypothetical 
EUMW threshold: generally, the sectors with smaller companies and lower collective agreement 
coverage are the ones where the impact of a common minimum wage threshold of 60% of the 
median would be largest.
52
 
 
6.2. Job-related characteristics 
Occupation 
As expected, employees in lower-skilled occupations would be the most impacted by the 
hypothetical EUMW. As can be seen in figure 10, the proportion of employees affected would be 
largest in elementary, skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery and service and sales occupations, 
while the more skilled occupations would be much less affected than the average. Taken together, 
almost half of the employees affected in Europe would be service and sales workers or those in 
elementary occupations.
53
 
 
                                                     
52
 With the data we are using (cross-sectional EU-wide datasets) it is not possible to adequately disentangle 
the individual impact of each of these factors, in order to establish which one is most important. At most, 
we can say that they seem to have a combined and consistent impact. Later, we will look again at this issue 
within a multivariate statistical model, where each factor is controlled by the others (as a ceteris paribus 
table), which shall allow us to evaluate which correlations seem most important; but even in that case, the 
cross-sectional nature of the analysis means that we cannot establish causal primacy, but only (controlled) 
statistical correlation. 
53
 According to SES data, it is as well clear that relatively more employees in lower skilled occupations 
would see their wages increases as a consequence of a EU MW (see Annex). Those in elementary 
occupations, skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers, service and sales workers would be those 
relatively more affected, which is consistent with the results presented in here. 
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By gender, a higher proportion of female employees would be affected across all occupation 
categories, but the highest difference as compared to the proportion of male employees affected 
(in percentage points) arise in the lower-skilled occupations: elementary, skilled agricultural, 
service and sales and plan and machine operators.  
 
Figure 10. Employees affected by the EUMW by sector 
 
Part-time employment 
More than a third of part-time employees would be affected by the introduction of the 
hypothetical EUMW, almost three times the proportion of full-time employees that would be 
affected in Europe (see figure 11). The gap (measured as a ratio) between the proportion of 
affected part-time and full-time employees would be largest in Belgium, France, Greece and 
Portugal. On the other hand, it would be narrower in Luxembourg and Sweden, according to EU-
SILC data (see Annex). When looking at part-time employment, it is necessary to differentiate 
between males and females, since the latter are generally much more likely to fall in this 
category, but this will be done when dealing with the distribution by gender. 
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Figure 11. Proportion of employees affected by type of employment 
 
It is important to remember that part-time employment represents less than 20% of total 
employment in Europe and it is far less present in many countries. So in most countries part-
timers would only represent a minority of the workers affected by the hypothetical EUMW 
policy. Only in the countries with a significant share of part-time employment (mostly 
Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and the UK) more than half of the employees affected in the whole 
country by the introduction of the EUMW would be part-timers. 
 
Temporary employees 
Temporary employees would also be much more affected than their permanent counterparts by 
the hypothetical common EUMW threshold: almost one in three temporary employees would be 
affected, as compared to 13.6% of permanent employees in Europe. Such differential impact by 
type of contract holds in all countries, as shown in figure 12. The ratio between temporary and 
permanent employees affected would be especially large in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Greece and 
Sweden, and narrower in Estonia, Lithuania and Ireland.
54
  
                                                     
54
 For most countries, data from the SES reflects an even wider difference between the proportion of 
temporary and permanent employees affected by the EU MW (measured as the ratio between the two) than 
the EU-SILC source. But the overall impact would be the same in both sources, around a third of the total 
workforce affected by the EU MW would be on a temporary contract (see annex).   
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Figure 12. Proportion of employees affected by the EUMW by type of contract 
 
 
6.3. Personal characteristics 
Gender 
The hypothetical EUMW threshold of 60% of the national median would clearly have a stronger 
impact on female workers. In the EU-27, the proportion of women below the threshold doubles 
that of men: the wages of 21.5% of all female workers across the EU are currently below the 
hypothetical EUMW threshold, as compared to less than 11% of males.  
 
 
Figure 13. Proportion of employees affected by the EUMW by gender 
  
This difference between females and males regarding the incidence of low-pay is present among 
all European countries, as indicated by the fact that they are all above the diagonal line depicted 
in figure 13, where all countries would be if the hypothetical EUMW would equally affect both 
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genders. Nevertheless, important disparities exist across countries. The gap (measured as a ratio) 
is very large in countries such as Cyprus and Czech Republic, while it is almost negligible in 
Denmark and Hungary.
55
 There is no relation between the magnitude of the gap and the female 
employment share in the different countries.
56
 
 
When trying to tentatively explain why women may earn lower wages, the higher incidence of 
part-time among women appears as a potential explanation. Figures 14 and 15 below inquire into 
this possibility and some interesting facts emerge. Both male and female part-time employees 
would be more affected by the hypothetical EUMW than their full-time counterparts. 
Nevertheless, the gap between men and women regarding incidence of low-pay only exists for 
full-time employees, as male and female employees working part-time would be similarly 
affected by the EUMW threshold. This is shown by the fact that the data points of most countries 
are relatively close to the diagonal in figure 15 representing part-time employment, whereas the 
share of full-time employees below the EUMW threshold is much larger for women than for men 
(in all countries except Denmark, as shown in figure 14). 
 
  
Figure 14. Proportion of full-time employees affected by the EUMW 
 
                                                     
55
 Measured as the ratio between the proportion of females affected and the proportion of males affected. If 
the gap is measured as the difference in percentages between the proportion of affected females and males, 
the gap would be largest in Cyprus, Germany and the UK. 
56
 The SES data produces a considerably smaller gap by gender regarding the incidence of low-pay, 
because of the sample limitations (it does not cover small companies and some sectors that have a different 
gender profile, such as public administration). For the EU-27, the proportion of females affected would 
only be 3% larger than that of males according to the SES data (11,2% as compared to 8,15% respectively). 
And in some countries this proportion would be basically the same (Hungary and Latvia) or even be higher 
for males than females (France and Romania), as shown in Annex. The EU-SILC provides a less biased 
picture of the distribution of pay by gender than the SES. 
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Figure 15. Proportion of part-time employees affected by the EUMW 
 
The previous two graphs show that the higher proportion of female employees potentially 
affected by the EUMW threshold (ie, of having a low-paid job) may be partially explained by the 
fact that women are much more likely to work part-time. But, importantly, there are other reasons 
for it, since having a full-time job reduces the likelihood of being below the EUMW threshold 
much more for men than for women.  
Level of education 
 
Lower-educated employees would be disproportionately affected by the hypothetical EUMW 
policy in nearly all countries: for the EU27, more than a quarter of all employees with up to lower 
secondary education are currently below such threshold, compared to 13% of those with at least 
upper secondary education. 
 
In some countries, the difference in the proportion of employees that would be affected by the 
hypothetical EUMW threshold by level of education is even higher: around three times higher in 
Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Bulgaria, Hungary, Luxembourg or Romania. On the 
contrary, Sweden, which is characterized by high (collectively agreed) minimum wage levels, is 
the only country where this employee’s gap along educational levels does not exist, as shown by 
figure 16 below. 
 
If we cross educational levels and gender, the ratio between the proportion of females and males 
that would be affected by the introduction of the hypothetical EUMW threshold remains similar 
along all educational levels.
57
 Moreover, the female employment share is almost 50% in the 
higher-educated population, while it is lower (43%) in the lower-educated workforce segment. In 
                                                     
57
 Among lower-educated employees, 37% of females and 18% of males would be affected by the 
hypothetical threshold; among higher-educated employees, these proportions would be 18 and 9% 
respectively. This means that for both educational groups, the proportion of female employees affected 
would be about twice that of males.  
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other words, the female gap in the incidence of low-pay, reported previously, cannot be explained 
by differences in educational levels. 
 
  
Figure 16. Proportion affected by the EUMW by education level 
 
Nevertheless, it is worth recalling that employees with up to lower secondary education represent 
less than a third of the total workforce that falls below the hypothetical EUMW threshold, since 
they represent less than 20% of the working population according to EU-SILC data. But in those 
countries where lower-educated employees represent a higher share of employment, this group 
does represent most of the total affected segment. This is the case in the Mediterranean countries 
(Portugal, Malta, Spain and Italy) and in Luxembourg. 
 
Age 
As underlined in the literature review, most of the empirical studies on the employment effects of 
minimum wages have focused on teenagers since this is the group generally considered to be 
most affected by minimum wages (see section 1 of this report). Figure 17 shows that the 
proportion of employees affected by the hypothetical EUMW threshold would follow a U-shape 
in terms of age, decreasing from a high starting point for younger workers until it starts rising 
again for those aged above 50 years old. The differentials by age are indeed quite large: 80% of 
those in the teenage group (aged 14-19) would be affected; 35% of those aged 20-24; and 16% of 
those aged 25-29. Then the proportion of employees affected in the following age categories 
would remain around levels of 12% before starting to pick-up again from the age category 55-59. 
Moreover, the graph shows that the gender gap in the proportion of employees affected increases 
with age.
58
 
 
Nevertheless, the relative significance of the youngest segments of the population in the low pay 
sector (and the elderly as well) markedly varies across Europe. On the one hand, in spite of the 
disproportionate impact that the hypothetical EUMW threshold would have on teens (80% of 
                                                     
58
 Information using the SES data presented in the Annex and is consistent with the one presented here. The 
main difference for the EU-27 aggregate is that the rise in the proportion of older employees affected only 
starts after 65 years, while in EU-SILC it occurs already from the 50s. 
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them would be affected), they represent a very small share of the European working population 
(less than 2%) and would therefore only account for less than 8%  of the total workforce affected 
by the EUMW threshold. On the other hand, young employees aged 20-29 would be less affected 
by the hypothetical EUMW threshold but they represent almost 20% of the European 
employment, and would account for more than 25% of the total workforce affected by the 
EUMW threshold. This overall picture changes to some extent when looking at individual 
country profiles, as analysed in box 6. 
 
  
Figure 17. Employees affected by age and gender 
 
Box 6. Diverging impact of the EUMW threshold across age groups and selected countries 
 
In countries like Sweden, Austria or Malta, young employees (aged 14-29) represent a much larger share of 
those below the hypothetical EUMW threshold, around half or more of the total. On the other hand, in 
many Central and Eastern European Countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia) and the UK, employees 
above 50 years of age represent an important share of the affected population (around 30%). Figure 18 
depicts the contrasting picture of Sweden and Estonia. In both cases the incidence of low-pay on the 
youngest groups is above the average, but in Sweden almost of the impact would concentrate on those with 
less than 35 years, whereas in Estonia those employees above 45 years would be strongly affected as well. 
 
Figure18. Employees affected by age in Sweden and Estonia  
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6.4. A multivariate approach 
 
In this section, we will present a statistical analysis based on multivariate regression models to 
determine which variables influence the likelihood of an employee being affected by the 
hypothetical EUMW threshold. The logistic regression model will follow the approach of the 
previous descriptive section, differentiating three broad types of variables as explanatory factors: 
socio-demographic variables (gender, age and educational level); company-related variables 
(firm’s size and economic sector); and job-related variables (type of employment, work 
experience, supervisory role in the company, type of contract and occupation). While the previous 
descriptive section looked at the extent to which certain groups would be impacted by the 
hypothetical EUMW threshold, the present approach will try to quantify the specific effect of 
each variable on the probabilities of an employee being affected by the EUMW threshold, 
keeping constant the effect of all the other variables in the model. 
 
A table with the detailed estimation results is presented in the Annex. The dependent variable is 
binary, holding a value of 0 if the individual falls above the hypothetical EUMW threshold of 
60% of the median, and 1 if she falls below (the group in which we are interested). For evaluating 
the impact of the different independent variables on the likelihood of falling below the EUMW 
threshold, we have run successive logistic regression models following a nested structure, in four 
steps: first, including only socio-demographic variables; second, adding company-related 
variables; third, adding job-related variables; and finally, adding country dummies to control for 
national specificities and evaluate their impact. The explanatory power of the successive models 
increases with each step, as measured by Nagelkerke´s Pseudo R2, which goes from .08 to .23. 
Although the pseudo R2 of the models are relatively low (suggesting that there may be 
explanatory variables omitted in the models, and/or that the data used is subject to a significant 
amount of statistical noise), most of the variables are statistically significant, which allows us to 
(carefully) discuss the results of the models. 
 
To simplify the presentation of the results, only the odds ratios of the logit estimation including 
all variables is presented in figure 19. Each bar in the chart represents the change in the odds of 
being below the hypothetical EUMW threshold associated with each categorical comparison. For 
instance, the odds of being below the threshold is 1.8 times (or 80%) higher for female than for 
male European employees: in other words, being a woman increases considerably the probability 
of being below the threshold. On the contrary, if the odds ratio are below 1, it means the odds 
would be lower: for instance, the odds of being below the threshold are 0.35 times (or 35%) lower 
for employees working in bigger companies than employees working in medium-sized 
companies.   
 
Regarding socio-demographic characteristics, female, lower-educated and younger employees 
have much higher odds of being affected by the introduction of the EUMW even under ceteris 
paribus conditions. In other words, even for the same type of employment status, occupation and 
sector women are 1.8 more likely to be below the EUMW threshold. The effect of age is 
particularly strong: the odds of being below the EUMW threshold are 2.4 times higher for 
younger employees aged 15-29 (and 1.12 higher for older employees aged above 55) than for the 
core of the workforce aged 30-54. This provides further confirmation that the younger segment of 
the workforce would be a major group of concern for policy makers when considering the 
potential impact of a EU-wide minimum pay scheme. 
 51 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Odds ratios of the logit regressions.  
Note: Bars fully coloured in black indicate variables which are significant at the 1% level; bars with white stripes 
indicate variables significant at the 5% level; lastly, grey bars indicate variables not significant at the 5% level. For the 
variables with only two categories, the one not shown in the graph is the reference.  For variables with more than two 
categories, these are the reference categories: firms employing 11-49 employees (for firm's size); financial sector (for 
economic activity); technicians and associated professionals (for occupations).    
 
If we look at the results of the model by steps, the explanatory power of socio-demographic 
variables is reduced mainly when job-related variables are introduced.
59
 This is especially the 
case for gender and level of education, since a significant part of the difference is associated with 
a different composition of those groups (in the case of level of education, the association between 
occupational level and education is actually endogenous, since the skill level is explicitly taken 
into account for classifying occupations; in the case of gender, the reduction in its impact when 
occupations and employment status are taken into account is the largely result of the well-known 
phenomenon of occupational gender segregation, see Grimshaw and Figuereido 2012). 
 
Overall, the impact of company-related variables seems to be smaller than that of socio-
demographic variables, since the Nagelkerke´s Pseudo R2 of the model only increases marginally 
when the former are included (from 0,08 to 0,11), and the coefficients of company-related 
variables are in general closer to 1 when looking at the general model including all variables. 
Nevertheless, working in smaller companies remains an important factor, since their odds of 
being below the EUMW threshold are 1.5 times higher than employees working in medium-sized 
companies. When considering sectors, and as compared to financial workers (a sector 
characterized by relatively low levels of low-pay), the odds of being below the EUMW threshold 
would be highest for employees in the agriculture and arts and entertainment sectors (and to a 
lower extent in the HORECA, real state activities, commerce, education, health and 
                                                     
59
 When company-related variables are introduced, the only socio-demographic variable that significantly 
loses explanatory power is education, which is related to the strong concentration of low-educated workers 
in certain economic sectors such as agriculture or HORECA.   
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communication sectors). On the other hand, these odds would be lower only for employees 
working in public administration, while in the manufacturing, construction and transportation 
sectors the odds would not be significantly different than for financial employees.
60
  
 
Lastly, job-related characteristics seem the most relevant to characterize which type of employees 
would be affected by the EUMW. The model increases significantly its explanatory power when 
they are introduced and many of them are associated with large odds ratios in the general model. 
Temporary, part-time and employees with little work experience would be more likely to be 
affected, while employees with a supervisory role would be less likely. The occupation of the 
employee has a strong impact: as compared to employees working as technicians, those in service 
and sales, skilled agricultural and, especially, elementary occupations would be much more likely 
to be affected by the EUMW. Employees in the remaining occupations would have as well higher 
odds of being affected than technicians, excluding professionals and managers, which would have 
lower odds.   
 
Since the logistic regression models provide information on the effect of each variable while 
controlling for all the rest, the coefficients associated to each country provide an interesting 
picture as well (included in the detailed results presented in the Annex). They indicate the odds of 
employees in the different countries being affected by the EUMW threshold, keeping constant the 
broad differences in social and economic structure (due to sectorial and occupational 
composition, age structure or incidence of part-time and temporary employment, among others). 
From this perspective, as compared to France (the country of reference), the countries where 
employees would have the highest odds to be under the EUMW threshold would be Lithuania, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Estonia, Latvia, UK and Romania (all above 2 times higher odds). On 
the other extreme, employees in Portugal, Malta, Finland, Greece, Slovakia, Spain and Belgium 
would have the lower odds of being affected by the EUMW threshold. 
 
Box 7. Determinants of being below the EUMW threshold across different minimum wage setting 
systems 
 
In the first half of this report, we classified European countries according to the minimum wage setting 
systems into two broad groups: countries with statutory national minimum wages and countries with 
collectively agreed sector-specific minimum wages. Since these systems produce rather different outcomes, 
it is useful to run the logistic regression separately within each of these country groups, to evaluate whether 
the determinants of being below the EUMW vary across them. 
 
Results of the regressions run separately for of these two groups of countries are shown in the Annex, and 
some important divergences arise. On the one hand, young employees and employees with a short work 
experience (and lower-educated employees to a lesser extent) are much more likely to be under the EUMW 
threshold in countries with collectively agreed sector-specific minimum wages. This seems to indicate that 
these segments of the workforce are more likely to be not covered by minimum wage protection in 
countries without statutory minimum wages. On the other hand, the sector variable loses much of its 
statistical significance for countries with statutory minimum wages, while it is very relevant for countries 
without them. In other words, sector differentials in the share of low pay are more significant in countries 
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 When job-related variables are added, the explanatory power of the firm’s size variable remains almost 
the same, while some sectoral variables experience a reduction in explanatory power. This indicates that in 
some sectors, the incidence of low-pay is partially explained by factors such as occupational composition 
of the workforce or incidence of part-time and temporary employment.  
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with collectively agreed minimum wages than in countries with a statutory system. 
 
Results are very similar when the regressions are run using the SES data. Detailed estimation 
results are presented in the Annex. SES permits a more detailed firm’s size breakdown and the 
results clearly confirm that the odds of employees being affected increase when companies are 
smaller. The effect of sector becomes not statistically significant when including the job-related 
variables. Instead of work experience, the SES includes the seniority of the employee in the 
company and results show that employees working less than two years in the company are more 
likely to be affected by the EUMW.  
 
SES includes two interesting variables which are not available in EU-SILC. Employees working 
in companies covered by a collective pay agreement and companies controlled by the public 
sector are significantly less likely to be found among those potentially affected by the EUMW. 
Within all the rest of variables, results are consistent between the SES and EU-SILC databases. 
 
7. Two further explorations: the potential impact on poverty and on 
competitiveness 
 
7.1. What impact would an EUMW have on poverty? 
As we said earlier (see section 1 of this report), the main justification for minimum wages is not 
the reduction of poverty, but the establishment of minimum labour standards under which no 
employment relation is considered socially acceptable. But that said, there seems to be at least a 
potential link between minimum wages and poverty, at least in-work poverty, since an increase in 
the lower earnings threshold should have an impact on the distribution of earnings at the bottom, 
and hence benefit those with insufficient earnings to make ends meet. Would the coordination of 
EUMW policy under the hypothetical parameters that we are evaluating in this report (ie, a 
common threshold of 60% of median wages) have an impact on poverty in Europe? 
 
To evaluate this issue, we have to change slightly the focus we have had throughout this report. 
All the analysis so far has focused on individual workers, but the issue of poverty is not only 
linked to the individual distribution of earnings, but to the household distribution of income as 
well; and it not only concerns workers, but the population in general. In this section, we will first 
keep an individual work-centered approach to evaluate to what an extent the hypothetical EUMW 
policy may help the European working poor. Second, we will look at the household distribution 
of income and poverty for the whole population, and evaluate to what an extent it may be affected 
by the hypothetical policy. 
 
As a first approximation, figure 20 shows the share of workers currently below the hypothetical 
EUMW threshold (60% of the median wage in each country) that are also below the poverty line 
at the household level.
61
 In other words, whether the workers that would in principle benefit from 
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 The poverty line is here defined in relative terms, using the approach of the EU-SILC: a household in 
relative poverty (or at risk of poverty) is one whose equivalised disposable income is less than 60% of the 
equivalised disposable income of the median household. Equivalised disposable income is calculated as the 
total income of a household, after tax and other deductions, that is available for spending or saving, divided 
by the number of household members converted into equalised adults; household members are equalised or 
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the hypothetical EUMW threshold live in poor households. On the one hand, this chart clearly 
shows that most EUMW workers do not live in relative poverty: on average, only one in five 
across the EU are below the poverty line –and consequently, 80% of the workers that would 
benefit from the EU threshold are currently above the poverty line. As could be expected, this 
magnitude varies considerably across EU countries, going from around 30% in Italy, 
Luxembourg and Bulgaria to less than 10% in Ireland: but everywhere, the vast majority of 
workers below the hypothetical EUMW threshold live in households above the poverty line. But 
on the other hand, if we compare workers below and above the EUMW threshold (also shown in 
figure 20, with grey bars), we can immediately see that the incidence of poverty for workers 
below the EUMW threshold is notably higher than for workers above the threshold. For the EU as 
a whole, less than 4% of workers above the EUMW threshold live in relative poverty, compared 
to 20% of those below: in other words, the incidence of poverty multiplies by five for workers 
below the threshold. A similar pattern can be seen in all EU countries, with no exception. So 
although most of the workers below the EUMW threshold do not live in poor households, there is 
a clear association between poverty and having a wage below our hypothetical threshold. 
 
 
Figure 20: Workers that live in households below the relative poverty line as a percentage of workers above 
and below the EUMW threshold 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
made equivalent by weighting each according to their age, using the so-called modified OECD equivalence 
scale (the first adult receives a value of 1, other adults 0.5 and children 0.3). 
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Figure 21: Workers that live in households below the relative poverty line as a percentage of all workers, 
and share above and below the EUMW threshold 
 
The reason for such pattern lies in the fact that within the EU, in-work poverty is a relatively 
small phenomenon. Figure 21 shows the overall incidence of in-work poverty at the individual 
level: in other words, how many workers in each country live in relative poverty. On average, for 
the EU as a whole, such percentage is barely 6%, according to the 2010 EU-SILC data we are 
using, ranging from around 10% in Lithuania and Luxembourg to less than 3% in Ireland, Czech 
Republic and Finland. Figure 21 shows also the share of those workers who are below the 
EUMW threshold of 60% of the median national wage (the black section of the bars), and as we 
can see, it is a very sizeable one. For the EU as a whole, more than 50% of all the working poor 
fall below the hypothetical EUMW threshold. At the country level, such percentage varies 
between 71% for Luxembourg and 25% in Portugal, but only in 3 countries it is below 40% 
(Portugal, Greece and the Czech Republic). If the establishment of a hypothetical EUMW of 60% 
of the median would raise the earnings of those people, we can say that it would raise the 
earnings of a majority of the working poor in most countries. 
 
But as we said earlier, poverty is a phenomenon which is best studied from the perspective of 
households, rather than individual workers. Figure 22 shows the overall incidence of relative 
poverty in Europe at the household level according to the EU-SILC 2010 data that we are using in 
this report.  The percentage of households across Europe whose equivalised disposable income is 
below 60% of the median in each country is 17.5%, with the usual variation across countries 
(from 24% in Bulgaria to less than 10% in the Czech Republic). But the important point for our 
purposes is that more than half of those households have no worker at all, as can be seen by the 
breakdown of the bars into the grey (no worker in the household) and black (at least 1 worker) 
segments. Furthermore, the share of poor households with workers below the EUMW threshold is 
even smaller, as can be seen by the grey triangle. 
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Figure 22: Percentage of households under the poverty line, and shares according to the employment status 
of their members 
 
Figure 23 makes this point even clearer by focusing on the share of poor households with workers 
in them. As we already saw in the previous chart, such share is relatively low: for the EU as a 
whole, it is 39%, and it is only significantly above 50% in Luxembourg and Romania. So in 
Europe, relative poverty is mostly concentrated in non-working households, households with no 
wage earner. But if we further break down such percentage into households with at least one 
worker below the hypothetical EUMW threshold and households where all earners are above the 
threshold, we can see that most of them are in the latter category. In other words, when the 
households below the poverty line have workers in them, they are more likely to be above the 
EUMW line (for the EU as a whole, the share of poor working households with no worker below 
the EUMW line is 66%). This is because the household composition of both groups differs: 
workers below the (household) poverty line but above the (individual) EUMW line tend to live in 
households which are larger and with fewer wage-earners. 
 
 
Figure 23: Share of households in relative poverty, according to the employment status of household 
members 
 
Finally, we can also use figure 23 to evaluate the potential impact of the hypothesized EUMW 
policy on overall poverty from a household perspective. The black section of the bars shows the 
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percentage of EU households in each country which have at least one worker below the EUMW 
line, and therefore the share of poor households that could benefit from the discussed policy. For 
the EU as a whole, such percentage is 13%, and only in two countries (Luxembourg and 
Lithuania) it is above 20%. So it seems fair to say that the overall impact of such a policy on 
relative poverty at the household level would be limited (of course, not taking into account 
potential spill-over or disemployment effects which are unpredictable but which could change 
completely the picture). This is because, on the one hand, household poverty in Europe is more 
related to not working at all than to having low wages; and on the other hand, because even for 
poor working households, the composition of the household has often a larger impact than being 
or not below the hypothetical EUMW threshold. 
 
In conclusion, we can say that, although the hypothetical EUMW policy could have a positive 
impact on individual-level in-work poverty in Europe, the significance of such impact is 
diminished by the fact that in-work poverty is not a widespread phenomenon in Europe. Looking 
at poverty at the household level and expanding the focus to the general population, we could see 
that in fact, most poverty in Europe is related either to not working at all (most poor households 
have no wage-earner) or to the composition of the household rather than to the wage earned by its 
members. What this means is that the impact that the hypothetical EUMW would have on 
household-level relative poverty would be quite minor (only 13% of poor households in Europe 
have one or more members currently earning below the EUMW threshold, and therefore would 
potentially benefit from such policy). 
 
 
 
7.2. What impact would an EUMW have on trade and competitiveness? 
An argument that is sometimes raised against minimum wage policy is that it can have a negative 
impact on international competitiveness and trade, to the extent that it involves an increase in unit 
labour costs (in other words, to the extent that the increase in pay is not compensated by an 
increase in productivity of a similar magnitude). This is a very difficult issue to study empirically, 
because there is no data on international competitiveness and trade at the company level that we 
could use to evaluate the impact of the hypothesized change in the wage distribution. 
What we can do, though, is a rough approximation by linking data from SES 2010 with external 
data on international trade, by country and 2-digit NACE sectors.  In other words, we can see 
whether the sectors (within each country) which are more export-oriented have a larger or smaller 
share of workers below the hypothetical EUMW threshold, as a way to do a rough evaluation of 
the potential impact of such a policy on trade. 
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Table 24: Share of employment by exports to value added and broad sectors 
 
The external data on trade we will use here comes from the World Input-Output Database,
62
 and 
refers to the share of exports to total value added in each specific sector and country.
63
 Table 24 
shows for the EU as a whole the distribution of employment according to the share of exports to 
value added,  breaking it down by broad economic sectors. As we can see, two thirds of 
employment is in sectors which are either non-tradable or where exports account for less than 
10% of overall value added: these sectors are mostly in low knowledge intensive services, 
education and health. The next category, with a share of trade in value added between 10 and 
50%, accounts for 12% of employment, mostly in knowledge intensive services and low 
technology industries. The two categories where exports account for a larger share of value added 
(more than 50%) account for roughly 20% of employment, and are mostly linked to high and low 
technology industries, and marginally to knowledge intensive services.
64
 
 
 
Table 25: Share of workers below the EUMW threshold, by exports share to value added and broad sectors 
 
Table 25 shows the share of workers below the hypothetical EUMW threshold for the same 
categories of trade share in value added and broad sectors. There is a clear relationship between 
the export intensity of the sector and the share of EUMW workers: overall, the incidence of such 
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 We are very grateful to Robert Stehrer, from the Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies, for 
providing us with this data. 
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 To avoid being biased by short-term fluctuations, we used the average of the period 2000-2010. 
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 The value of more than 100% occurs when a sector imports intermediate goods, adds some value to 
them, and exports them again. The value of those exports include the value of the intermediate goods, 
hence the seemingly strange result. 
Non-tradable Less 10% 10-50% 50-100% More 100%
Primary 0.0% 17.0% 79.2% 1.9% 1.9% 0.6%
Construction 0.0% 86.5% 13.5% 0.0% 0.0% 6.1%
    LTI 0.7% 4.4% 26.3% 17.4% 51.3% 15.3%
    HTI 0.0% 0.0% 9.3% 37.6% 53.1% 7.2%
   LKIS 60.5% 33.1% 5.0% 1.0% 0.4% 31.5%
    KIS 16.8% 43.6% 24.9% 3.4% 11.3% 16.4%
Education 54.8% 45.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9.7%
 Health 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 13.5%
  Total 40.7% 27.9% 11.6% 6.2% 13.6% 100.0%
Employment 
by sector
Employment by share of exports in value added
Non-tradable Less 10% 10-50% 50-100% More 100%
Primary 0.0% 3.9% 1.8% 5.3% 0.2% 2.2%
Construction 0.0% 8.3% 25.1% 0.0% 0.0% 10.6%
    LTI 23.5% 33.9% 14.5% 12.5% 6.9% 11.2%
    HTI 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 3.1% 5.3% 4.2%
   LKIS 14.6% 12.0% 9.3% 9.7% 5.6% 13.4%
    KIS 6.6% 13.0% 3.9% 2.2% 2.5% 8.1%
Education 7.1% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.3%
 Health 6.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.8%
  Total 10.5% 10.3% 9.7% 7.4% 5.9% 9.5%
Share of workers below the EUMW threshold by share of exports in value added
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policy would be two times larger in the non-traded than in the highly traded sectors; and within 
each sector, the most traded sub-sectors consistently have a smaller share of workers below the 
EUMW threshold. For instance, low technology industries have an overall share of workers 
below the EUMW threshold of 11% (slightly above average), but such share is much larger in the 
subsectors with a lower trade intensity: the LTI subsectors where trade intensity in value added is 
below 50% (which account for roughly one third of all LTI employment) have on average 20% of 
employment below the EUMW threshold, compared to 13% for the LTI subsectors where trade 
accounts for between 50 and 100% of value added and only 7% for the LTI subsectors where 
exports are above 100% of value added. In the most export-oriented subsectors of high 
technology industries and knowledge intensive services, on the other hand, only between 2 and 
5% of workers are below the EUMW threshold. 
 
Figure 26 shows the share of workers in the most export-oriented sectors (where trade accounts 
for more than 50% of value added) that would be affected by the hypothetical EUMW policy. As 
we can see, only in Latvia more than 20% of workers would be affected, a proportion which 
reaches 15% in Lithuania, 13% in Poland, 12% in Ireland and Hungary. In all the other countries, 
less than 1 in 10 employees in these sectors would be affected (less than 1 in 20 in Italy, Portugal, 
Spain, France, Luxembourg, Sweden and Finland). 
 
 
Figure 26: Share of workers below the EUMW threshold in export-oriented sectors (share of exports to 
value added above 50%) 
 
So with very few exceptions, it seems very unlikely that an EUMW policy setting a threshold of 
60% of the national median wage would have any impact of significance on exports and 
international competitiveness. Of course, we could only do a very rough approximation, that was 
not based on a very precise measure of trade intensity nor did it take into account for instance 
possible spill-over or other indirect effects. Still, there are some important reasons to think that 
the results presented in this short section may have even overestimated the potential impact of the 
EUMW policy on exports and trade (in other words, that they may be even smaller). First, we had 
to use SES for this exercise because EU-SILC does not include the necessary detail in the sector 
variable: but as we have repeatedly said, SES has the very important problem of not including 
companies with less than 10 employees, a bias which is especially significant in this case because 
the vast majority of these companies are probably not export-oriented and (as we have shown in 
previous sections) have a much larger share of workers below the EUMW threshold. Second, the 
fact that the proposed policy involves a simultaneous increase of minimum wages towards the 
threshold in most European countries could reduce significantly the potential impact on 
competitiveness at the country level, since most international trade of member states is intra-EU 
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(if the wage structure of the most important competitors increases similarly, the relative 
competitiveness vis-à-vis them would remain unchanged). 
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